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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Puzzle
Elections are the bedrock of democracy. The right of ordinary citizens to influence
political decisions, directly or through the selection of representatives, is the defining ele-
ment of a democratic system. Intrinsic to the merit of elections is the availability of distinct
options from which voters can choose, may it be ideologically-opposing political parties or
simply an alternative to who is in power.1 And given the power of citizens in an election
emanates from the existence of options, the absence of alternatives to choose from implies
no control for the populace while a larger number of choices should provide individuals
with a greater sense of control over the political process.
In fact, scholars have argued that a larger number of parties competing in an elec-
tion should promote a more diverse set of options on the political menu of individuals, thus
enhancing electors’ potential to select an alternative that better represents their preferences
(Coppedge 2007, Dalton 2008, Norris 2004). In other words, the expansion of electoral
alternatives implies an approximation to the democratic ideal of interest-based representa-
tion, which should heighten ordinary citizens’ levels of political efficacy (Karp 2012, Karp
and Banducci 1999, Karp, Banducci and Bowler 2008), or “the feeling that individual po-
litical action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process” (Campbell and
Miller 1954, p. 184).
A complementary proposition suggests that a larger set of contestants incentivizes
parties to distinguish themselves by generating various policy proposals that more closely
align with the preferences of citizens, and to assure that information is communicated ef-
1 In a quote that represents what has been coined as the minimalist definition of democracy, Przeworski
et al. (2000, p. 54) state that “Democracy is a system in which incumbents lose elections and leave office
when the rules so dictate.”
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fectively to the electorate (Downs 1957). This theory of surging competition proposes that
as the number of contestants increase, parties will invest more in outreach efforts to inform
and mobilize the public, which should in turn lead to a higher level of efficacy from citizens
(Karp and Banducci 2008, Karp 2012).
Based in part on these arguments, experts have advocated that new democracies
institute some form of proportional electoral formula that can stimulate the creation of
multiple political parties (Norris 1997, Lijphart 1999).2 As a matter of fact, elections in
the majority of developing democracies are contested by multiple parties, and elections
in many of the youngest democracies have been marked by a multitude of options on the
electoral ballot.3 But do higher or increasing levels in the number of electoral options
actually instill a greater sense of efficacy among citizens?
This dissertation is motivated by this question. In trying to understand the impact of
more electoral options on individuals’ perception about their role in politics, I dispute the
claim that more options is necessarily better for the public.4 I posit that the public’s lack
of constrained belief-systems and limited ability to absorb and process political informa-
tion hampers the potential benefits associated with more electoral options (Converse 1964).
Furthermore, I contend that scholars have assumed that more parties promote the empow-
erment of citizens due to a confounding positive effect between proportional representation
and turnout while existing works provide little evidence that more parties increase ordinary
citizens’ political efficacy through the congruity of preferences between the mass public
and political parties or through increasing incentives to mobilize potential electors through
outreach efforts. Instead, I rely on works from psychology, especially social-cognitive the-
2 Other outcomes associated with the implementation of a proportional formula are an increase in voter
turnout (Blais and Carty 1990, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Powell 1986), higher satisfaction with elections,
particularly among supporters of losing parties (Anderson and Guillory 1997, Anderson et al. 2005), and the
improved representation of social minorities (Norris 1997).
3 Young democracies like Kosovo, Tunisia, Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of the inflated number
of contestants in recent elections. Exceptions to this pattern tend to be former British colonies where the
Westminster system was implemented. For a distribution of effective number of legislative parties (ENLP) in
developing democracies by regions of the world (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), see appendix A.
4 As mentioned above, however, it is important to note that at least two alternatives is fundamental to
give citizens’ at least some agency over the decision-making process.
2
ory, to theorize that increasing the amount and complexity of political information, like
increasing the number of electoral options, tends to negatively affect the engagement of
individuals with politics due to lower levels of political efficacy.
In this introductory chapter, I discuss the limitations of arguments that suggest more
electoral options should improve citizens’ political efficacy by reviewing findings from the
psychology and political behavior literatures that challenge assumptions about the benefits
of an expansive set of electoral choices for citizens. In the second chapter, I elaborate my
theory of why multiparty systems lead to lower levels of efficacy, and test how variation
in the number of political parties affects perceptions of political efficacy with panel data
from New Zealand, survey data across subnational units in Brazil, and with nearly 100
surveys across 25 countries of the Americas. In the third chapter, I explore a behavioral
implication of lower levels of efficacy by analyzing how rates of turnout are affected by
varying number of candidates across municipalities in Colombia and Brazil, and across
time in New Zealand. In the fourth chapter, I debate the validity of results that point
toward a positive relationship between the number of parties and citizens’ level of political
knowledge by demonstrating that results from an important pioneering study suffer from
lack of robustness due to arbitrary decisions in the statistical analysis, and by conducting
an original test of this relationship with a larger dataset composed of 88 surveys from 48
countries.
1.2 The Case for More Electoral Choices
The case for a positive effect of more options on individual efficacy is grounded
on two main ideas: 1) the optimization of the linkage between individuals and parties,
2) the benefits of increasing party competition for citizens- and two main findings: 3) a
positive correlation between number of parties and voter turnout, and 4) results that indicate
individuals in countries with more parties have higher levels of political knowledge than in
systems with fewer parties.
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1.2.1 Diversity of Options and Mobilization
By offering a wider range of options on the electoral ballot, systems with multiple
parties are theorized to provide ordinary individuals with a better chance of finding a po-
litical party that represents their preferences (Coppedge 2007, Dalton 2008, Norris 2004).
In essence, the argument rests on the idea that with a larger set of menu options, even the
pickiest of voters will find a party to their liking. For example, suppose citizens have views
either in favor or against government intervention on the economy and either in favor or
against same-sex marriage. In this simple scenario of two political dimensions, in order for
all potential electors to find a party that aligns with their preferences, there would have to
be at least four distinct political options.5 The addition of an extra binary issue dimension,
e.g. joining international organizations or not, means that in order for all possible combina-
tions of opinions be represented by a unique party, the number of electoral options would
need to increase geometrically to eight. Hence, the diversity of options hypothesis states
that because a larger number of parties should provide a more diverse set of options on the
political menu of the mass public, those who would otherwise feel alienated by a limited
choice set to participate in politics are more likely to be motivated to participate in politics
(Dalton 2008, Karp 2012, Ladner and Milner 2006).
The second interrelated argument in favor of more electoral options for the individ-
uals is that the existence of more parties in an election increases the incentives for parties to
provide potential voters with better information and dedicate more resources toward voter
mobilization efforts. That is, in a scenario in which there are multiple competitors, par-
ties have the incentive to diversify their offerings and assure that citizens understand the
distinctiveness between options (Downs 1957). And even if the general population does
not have fixed preferences over all issue dimensions, parties could gain electoral support
through mobilization through effective political communication and targeted interactions
5 That is, in favor of economic intervention and in favor of same-sex marriage, in favor of economic
intervention and against same-sex marriage, against economic intervention and in favor of same-sex marriage,
and against economic intervention and against same-sex marriage.
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with potential voters (Karp 2012, Karp and Banducci 1999, Karp, Banducci and Bowler
2008).6 Hence, the mobilization hypothesis proposes that more parties should lead to more
competition between alternatives, which in turn should lead to more outreach efforts from
parties including effective information that improve the public’s level of perceived efficacy.
The extent to which these two mechanisms have found empirical support is, how-
ever, limited. Karp and Banducci (1999) find that the perception of vote effectiveness
and levels of internal efficacy improved, on average, after the number of parties increased
in the first election after the implementation of a more proportional electoral formula in
New Zealand.7 Yet, Karp and Bowler (2001) find that satisfaction with democracy in New
Zealand started to drop a year and a half into the new system due to preferences for single
party government. Karp and Banducci (2008) fail to find a relationship between the number
of parties in parliament and a measure of political efficacy with data from the Comparative
Study of Electoral Studies. In fact, their results suggest that larger numbers of parties in the
coalition government are associated with a decrease in perceptions of vote efficacy. Finally,
Karp (2012) does not find a larger number of parties to be associated with higher rates of
individuals reporting experiences of mobilization in Europe.
Comparative studies of ideology and partisanship also indicate that a larger frag-
mentation in party system is associated with lower levels of ideology-based voting and
weaker attachment to political parties.8 For instance, larger number of parties or candi-
dates is associated with lower levels of partisan attachments (Huber, Kernell and Leoni
2005, Lupu 2015b), moderately lower levels of self-placement on the left-right spectrum
in Latin America (Zechmeister and Corral 2013, Singer 2016)9, lower levels of trust in po-
6 Mueller and Murrell (1986) suggest that parties are specifically incentivized to compete for the vote of
the poor given variation in electoral participation is often explained by the turnout rates of the less well-off.
7 I discuss the process that led to the change in electoral system and its impact on the general public in
more detail in chapter 2.
8 Considering that feelings of political efficacy should be both a cause and a product of partisanship-
those who have an attachment to a party should feel more efficacious, and those who are confident in their
capability to understand politics should be more likely to dedicate cognitive efforts to sort through the parties
and find one that best aligns with their preferences- we should expect a positive relationship between number
of parties and levels of party identification.
9 It should be noted that earlier studies from Western Europe find that individuals’ self-placement on left-
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litical parties in Eastern Europe (Ceka 2012), and lower levels of ideological voting (Dal-
ton 2008, Lau and Redlawsk 2006) and correct voting (Cunow 2014, Lau and Redlawsk
1997).10
In addition to the shortage of empirical results in favor of more electoral options,
these arguments stand in contrast to research on individuals’ cognitive ability to process
information and make decisions.11 For example, studies in psychology suggest that in-
creasing the number of choices may lead individuals to become discouraged by the efforts
necessary to make an informed decision, particularly in decisions in which the stakes are
high (Luce, Bettman and Payne 1997, Schwartz 2004, Huang and Zhang 2013). Experi-
ments on consumer behavior provide evidence that more options can be demotivating as
people are less likely to purchase products or to engage in activities when offered a larger
number of options (Iyengar and Lepper 2000, Iyengar 2010). Also, works from political
behavior suggest that large amounts of options and information can lead to voter indeci-
sion, inaction, information overload, and disengagement from politics (Cunow 2014, Lau
and Redlawsk 2006, Rahn, Aldrich and Borgida 1994, Renno´ 2004, Sniderman and Leven-
dusky 2007).
Added options to the political menu of ordinary citizens could be valuable if in-
dividuals were able to observe and process large amounts of information about available
choices (Schwartz 2004). That is, the benefits of more options is likely to be enjoyed by
those who have clear policy preferences and resources to digest complex political informa-
tion. In reality, however, the great majority of ordinary citizens do not have high levels of
political knowledge nor high levels of motivation to become better informed (Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996).
One could argue that in order to make sense of complex informational contexts,
right scale are more closely connected to issue positions and partisanship in multiparty systems (Inglehart
and Klingemann 1976, Huber 1989, Knutsen 1997).
10 Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) actually find the total number of electoral options to be associated with
higher levels of partisanship, but a stronger negative association between the effective number of legislative
parties and partisanship levels.
11 For a review of this literature, see Druckman (2005).
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“encyclopedic knowledge” of candidates’ policies is not necessary (Lupia 1994). While it
is plausible that individuals may be able to overcome limitations in the process of digest-
ing information through the use of heuristics (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986, Sniderman,
Brody and Tetlock 1991, Lupia and McCubbins 1998), an increase in the number of options
potentially require more or better heuristics to avoid the increasing demands of processing
more information. In fact, a second wave of studies on heuristics suggest that the effective-
ness of informational shortcuts is debatable, or at least, often limited (Bartels 1996, Kinder
1998, Kuklinski et al. 2001, Lau and Redlawsk 2001).12 The effectiveness of a short-
cut depends on the accurateness of the information (Bartels 1996), as well as the amount
of information required from individuals to recollect (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). And
because the amount of information tends to be larger and less precise in scenarios with
multiple options (Schwartz 2004), the effectiveness of heuristics should also be reduced.
Finally, the effectiveness of heuristics also tends to be conditioned by an individual’s level
of political awareness or sophistication- those who most need informational shortcuts (less
knowledgeable) are not only less likely to use heuristics, but also less likely to use it cor-
rectly (Lau and Redlawsk 2001, Lau and Redlawsk 2006).13 Therefore, as much as political
parties serve as important shortcuts for citizens to understand politics, their heuristic util-
ity begin to fall apart as the number increases, potentially transforming a helpful aid for
citizens into an increasingly more difficult piece of information to use.
12 For example, Merolla, Stephenson and Zechmeister (2008) find that Canadians students struggled to
make use of party heuristics, and that individual differences are important in shaping the effectiveness of
heuristics.
13 Yet, because politically sophisticated individuals are more likely to use heuristics, they are also more
likely to be led astray by non-stereotypic heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk 2001, Lau and Redlawsk 2006). That
is, when shortcuts provide misleading signals, the decisions by the more politically sophisticated are more
likely to be negatively affected. It should be noted, moreover, that the politically sophisticated may actually
be less likely to use a simple heuristic when offered a larger amount of issue-specific information (Kam
2005).
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1.2.2 Levels of Turnout in Multiparty Systems
Aside from the diversity of options and mobilization arguments, an important
source for why some scholars believe that more parties improves the efficacy of citizens
originates from the assumption that because elections with more parties tend to have higher
levels of turnout, there is a causal relationship between the two variables (e.g. Coppedge
2007, Dalton 2008, Karp 2012, Ladner and Milner 2006, Norris 2004). The problem with
this inference is that the simple bivariate association does not account for the fact that the
degree of proportionality associated with an electoral formula is a predictor of both number
of parties and levels of turnout. That is, proportional electoral formulas motivate citizens to
turn out due to a higher probability that their participation will have an impact on the final
outcome of the election (Duverger 1954, Blais and Carty 1990, Jackman 1987), and also
lead to a higher number of political parties due to inherently lower threshold for parties to
gain seats (Duverger 1954, Lijphart 1997, Powell 1984, Powell 1986). Consequently, to
assess the isolated effect of number of parties on voter turnout, it is necessary to isolate the
influence of disproportionality. Otherwise, the estimated relationship between number of
parties and turnout might be biased. The positive bivariate association between number of
parties and turnout seems to be, I argue, spuriously correlated due to the fact proportionality
of the electoral formula is omitted from this analysis.
Existing studies of voter turnout distinguish the estimated effect of number of par-
ties from the impact of disproportionality by including both in multivariate regression mod-
els of turnout. Results indicate that, on average, a larger effective number of parties actually
depresses turnout after controlling for degree of disproportionality (Blais and Carty 1990,
Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Jackman 1987, Jackman and Miller 1995), or does not seem
to have a significant effect (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007, Fornos, Power and Garand 2004,
Pe´rez-Lina´n 2001). Recent experimental work from Brazil also finds that in scenarios with
a larger choice set, individuals are more likely to abstain, less likely to acquire informa-
tion, and less likely to choose the correct candidate due to larger cognitive costs for the
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mass public (Cunow 2014). In chapter three, I expand on the idea that the positive associ-
ation between a larger number of political parties and higher levels of turnout is spurious,
and test the direction and mechanisms of the relationship between number of parties and
turnout with municipal-level electoral data from Brazil and Colombia, and across time in
New Zealand.
1.2.3 Variation in Political Knowledge across Countries
Lastly, scholars suggest that more electoral options is beneficial for the mass
public based on findings that suggest a larger number of parties among countries with
fewer than 2.5 effective number of legislative parties (ENLP) is associated with a higher
level of political knowledge (Gordon and Segura 1997, Berggren 2001). According to these
works, systems with more political parties offer citizens with more opportunities to learn
about the positions of parties because of the systemic incentives parties have to differentiate
themselves in contexts with more competitors (Downs 1957, Gordon and Segura 1997,
Berggren 2001, Busch 2016). Yet, these works also argue and find that a larger effective
number of parties is associated with lower levels of knowledge for countries with more
than 2.5 ENLP (Gordon and Segura 1997, Berggren 2001). More recent works, however,
find the relationship between the number of parties in a country’s system and the average
level of political knowledge may be null or even negative (Clark 2016. Fortin-Rittberger
2016, Turgeon and Lloyd 2017).
In chapter four, I review this mixed set of findings and replicate the original results
of Gordon and Segura (1997), this literature’s pioneering and seminal piece. After reeval-
uating the modeling and interpretation of the results presented by the authors, I provide
evidence that the result of heterogeneous effects, in which the estimated effect of more
parties is positive for systems with fewer than 2.5 but negative for those with more than
2.5 effective parties is a product of the cut-off used to divide the groups. Moreover, the
results are largely driven by an arbitrary strategy to impute values for “Don’t know” re-
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sponses. Additionally, I use a larger dataset from the Comparative Studies of Electoral
System (CSES) to reproduce their analysis, which corroborates the artificiality of the re-
sults due to the imputation strategy. Hence, I posit that the conclusions based on those
findings should be taken with considerable caution. In par with more recent works, the
results my analysis do not indicate a clear relationship between the number of parties and
citizens’ level of political knowledge.
Chapter five concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the limitations and im-
plications of the argument and empirical analyses presented here.
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Chapter 2
Internal Political Efficacy in Complex Informational Environments
2.1 Introduction
Studies of public opinion have long recognized the importance of political efficacy,
as individuals who perceive themselves as capable of understanding and having an impact
on what happens in politics are more likely to support the democratic system and to par-
ticipate in politics (Campbell et al. 1960, Easton and Dennis 1967, McPherson, Welch and
Clark 1977, Pateman 1970).1 But while the measurement and variation of political effi-
cacy across individuals has been extensively investigated by scholars, works in political
science still lack a psychological theory of how individuals develop this belief and the ex-
tent to which variation in the political context shapes this process.2 In this chapter, I seek
to fill this gap by providing a framework for the comparative study of internal efficacy by
proposing hypotheses about how the characteristics of political competition, particularly
the number of parties, influence individuals’ political efficacy beliefs. I test the validity of
my hypotheses with panel survey data from New Zealand, subnational data from Brazil,
and a large comparative dataset of survey respondents in the Americas.
2.2 A Framework for the Comparative Study of Political Efficacy
Political efficacy is defined by Campbell and Miller (1954, p. 187) as “the feel-
ing that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political pro-
cess.” But as noted by Lane (1959), the concept of political efficacy can be divided into
1 In the words of Almond and Verba (1963, p. 257), “The self-confident citizen appears to be the demo-
cratic citizen. Not only does he think he can participate, he thinks others ought to participate as well. Fur-
thermore, he does not merely think he can take part in politics, he is likely to be more active.”
2 Vecchione and Caprara (2009, p. 487) highlight this shortcoming by noting the inattention of political
scientists to some of the seminal works in psychology on the topic, “(s)urprisingly, despite the vast literature
on political efficacy, little attention has been paid to Bandura’s (1986) work on perceived self-efficacy and to
social-cognitive theory.”
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two components that differentiate beliefs individuals hold about their own capacity to effec-
tively engage in politics (internal) from perceptions about the extent to which institutions
and its political agents effectively respond to their political demands (external).3 This dis-
tinction separates the individual from the exterior world by recognizing that as much as
individuals may believe they have the capabilities to comprehend politics and be effective
actors in the political process, institutional constraints may impede the realization of this
potential.4 Throughout the chapter, I focus most of the discussion and data analysis on in-
ternal efficacy because I am interested in individuals’ assessment of their own capabilities,
although the empirical measurements of the two tend to be correlated (Stewart et al. 1992).
According to social cognitive theory, the most influential sources through which
beliefs of self-efficacy are shaped are personal experiences (Bandura 1997).5 Individuals’
recollections of previous attempts to execute an action greatly influence the perception
of self-capacity to perform similar tasks successfully in the future. This means that in
the realm of politics, individuals who are able to absorb and digest political information
develop higher levels of political self-efficacy. On the other hand, individuals who struggle
to grasp the interactions between political actors and their implications become, on average,
less interested in engaging with politics due to lower self-efficacy beliefs. Mansbridge
(1980) offers evidence of this phenomenon by showing that individuals who had positive
experiences in local political meetings in Vermont became more psychologically equipped
for future participation. Likewise, Madsen (1987) finds that individuals who are successful
at petitioning the government develop higher levels of internal efficacy, and Bowler and
3 Clarke and Acock (1989, p. 552) distinguish the two by defining internal political efficacy as “the
perception that one has the requisite skills and resources to influence the political system”, and external
efficacy as “the perception that government institutions and elites are responsive to one’s attempts to exert
political influence”.
4 For example, as much as an African American may have felt highly qualified and motivated to enter
politics in southern states during the 1950s, the institutional settings of the time would not permit it. In this
example, the individual has a high level of internal efficacy but because of his or her likely view that the
political institutions would reject such participation, that individual’s level of external efficacy would be quite
low- “I am quite capable of expressing my political voice (high internal efficacy), but the political system will
not/does not listen” (low external efficacy).
5 The other three types of sources are: vicarious learning, persuasion and physiological state (Bandura
1997).
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Donovan (2002) find that having more experiences with direct political participation is
linked to a greater sense of political efficacy.6
Context-level factors have the potential to impact a citizenry’s level of political ef-
ficacy beliefs by systematically affecting the political experiences of individuals. In partic-
ular, the institutional arrangement that greatly influences ordinary individuals’ relationship
with politics is the party system. The organization of political competition by parties pro-
vides the frame with which citizens perceive and interact with political debates and policy
decisions (Campbell et al. 1960, Norris 1997). And while individuals’ central beliefs may
be stable, most of what ordinary citizens think and know about politics is based on periph-
eral beliefs shaped by the salience of issues (Converse 1964, Zaller 1992), which in turn are
heavily influenced by strategic political actors and their framing of issues (Carmines and
Stimson 1991, Kinder and Sanders 1996). Thus, arrangements of political actors whose
actions and discourses lead to an increase in the amount and complexity of information de-
mand higher cognitive resources from citizens, consequently lowering their self-perceived
levels of of efficacy. In other words, because individuals have more difficulty acquiring
and processing political information in complex informational environments, their internal
efficacy suffers.
One crucial dimension of party systems that contributes to the degree of complexity
in the informational environment is the number of parties. The expansion of the number of
actors competing for power affects the amount and type of political information, making
the process of grasping what happens in politics for citizens more difficult. More parties or
candidates in the political environment demands the processing of additional information
and increased evaluations of which issues or candidate characteristics matter more or less
from citizens.7
6 Higher sense of efficacy and participation is also connected to programs of civic learning (Finkel 2002)
and local-level political participation (Altschuler and Corrales 2012).
7 Coalitions may act as heuristics to simplify the process of attributing responsibility to parties, but
because parties tend to run separate campaigns while having different leaders, names, and logos, the amount
of information in the political environment to process is also inherently larger.
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The number of parties is, of course, not the only feature of party competition that af-
fects the complexity of informational environment. The extent to which the party system is
institutionalized and polarized may also shape the level of complexity for individuals. The
institutionalization of the party system, defined by the stability of party competition across
time, can facilitate the task of learning and assessing the political issues not only by provid-
ing consistency in the options for potential voters, but also by structuring political debates
and preferences over time (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). If instead, parties do not have
strong ties in society, are not ideologically coherent, and are transient in nature, the task of
assessing the work of political actors becomes increasingly difficult (Mainwaring 1999). In
fact, Stewart et al. (1992) find that the degree of dissimilarity between the provincial and
federal party systems in Canada shape the structure of political efficacy beliefs between the
two levels.
Likewise, the degree to which parties have distinct positions on policy issues shapes
the dynamics of political competition (Sartori 1976), and in turn should affect the level of
difficulty for individuals to differentiate between them (Lupu 2013). That is, the degree
of differentiation between parties across issue dimensions affects the saliency of political
cleavages and facilitate the need to sort and contrast political actors (Dalton 2008, Roberts
2002).
The extent to which the number of parties, or other features of party system like
institutionalization and polarization, have an impact on difficulty to process political in-
formation should vary according to individuals’ cognitive resources. Given politically so-
phisticated individuals are better able to absorb and organize political information, and
the number of years of schooling is directly correlated with political sophistication and
participation (Zaller 1992, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), I hypothesize that complex in-
formational environments should have a larger impact on individuals with lower levels of
education.8 More specifically, because formal education enhances one’s ability to under-
8 I recognize that there is not a consensus about the effect of formal education on sophistication and
participation among scholars (e.g. Luskin 1987, Kam and Palmer 2008).
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stand political information (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Price and Zaller 1993, Jerit,
Barabas and Bolsen 2006), individuals with more years of education should not only be
more efficacious, but also be less affected by the difficulty of complex party system con-
figurations. Conversely, those with lower levels of schooling should be particularly subject
to informational environments that require cognitive efforts to thoroughly process the com-
plexities of politics.9
2.3 Empirical Evidence
I examine these propositions in three stages. First, I leverage a reform of electoral
rules in New Zealand to explore the extent to which the public’s feelings of efficacy were
affected by the increase in the number of parties in parliament. In a second step, I examine
what specific factors about the configuration of electoral choices explain differences in
levels of efficacy beliefs across municipalities in Brazil. Finally, I expand the argument
to a comparative setting by assessing the extent to which characteristics of a country’s
party system predict levels of efficacy between nations and individuals with different levels
of education with survey data from four rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys and
standard measures of party system characteristics.10
2.3.1 Panel Analysis in New Zealand
New Zealand is a unique case in the study of the impact of electoral institutions
on political behavior because it recently reformed its electoral system from a traditional
first-past-the-post system (FPTP) to a mixed member proportional representation (MMP).
This change in electoral system was seen by scholars as an opportunity to test previous
9 On a similar note, Renno´ (2004) find that those with levels of political awareness are able to retain more
political information than the less aware as election day nears, which indicates their ability to manage larger
amounts of information.
10 I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for making the data available, and support-
ers of the AmericasBarometer, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University.
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findings from cross-national comparisons and new hypotheses about the effects associated
with different electoral formulas. Yet, as will I discuss later in this section and in the next
chapter, it is actually difficult to make strong inferences about the independent impact of
changes to the electoral system on individuals’ attitudes based on the New Zealand case
because the initiative to change the electoral laws is a product of the public’s negative
attitudes toward the earlier system. Having said that, it is still worth exploring the changes
in political efficacy associated with the transformation of electoral laws and party system
in this important case.
For more than 60 years (1935-1995), either the left-of-center Labour party or the
right-of-center National party held an absolute majority in New Zealand’s only legislative
chamber, the House of Representatives. Yet, after consecutive elections in 1978 and 1981
in which the National party won a majority of seats in spite of receiving a slightly smaller
share of the popular vote than the Labour party, and the third most-voted party received
16.1% and 20.7% but ended up with fewer than 2.5% of seats, New Zealanders started to
become skeptical about the fairness of their elections (Donald 2003).
Shortly after the Labour party won a majority of seats in the 1984 elections after
promising to appoint a commission to look into issues related to the country’s electoral
system, the national parliament established the Royal Commission on the Electoral System.
The commission published its report in late 1986 strongly recommending the adoption of
a German-style mixed-member system, an expansion of the size of parliament from 92
to 120, and that parliament initiate a referendum for the populace to vote on the report’s
propositions (Royal Commission on the Electoral System 1986).11
The Labour administration did not move forward with the referendum and ended
up defeated by the National party in the 1990 election. But although the National party
had promised to hold a referendum during that year’s election campaign, internal disputes
within the party led the government to postpone taking any further action pertaining to the
11 The report also discussed other issues such as Maori representation, campaign finance and length of
term.
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referendum (Ministry of Culture and Heritage of New Zealand 2016). In the mean time,
a group called Electoral Reform Coalition was formed to lobby in favor of the implemen-
tation of the commission’s proposals. As public pressure started to soar, the government
decided to hold a non-binding referendum to evaluate the public’s favorability of altering
the electoral system, as well as what type electoral system among four proposed alterna-
tives had the highest support (Renwick 2010). Even though only 55% of the registered
voters participated, an overwhelming majority of roughly 85% voted in favor of a change
to the electoral system, including 71% who preferred the commission’s proposed MMP
system.
This result led to the scheduling of a second and this time binding referendum to be
held during the 1993 general elections. The new referendum generated a national debate
in which the Electoral Reform Coalition stood on the side of change while leaders of both
major parties and business groups were against the adoption of the new system (Vowles
et al. 1995). While participation rate was higher in the second referendum, the dispute
was much tighter. In the end, approximately 54% of voters chose the adoption of the new
mixed-member system in which 64 seats are elected in majoritarian districts and 49 seats
are selected through a national election of party lists.12 Therefore, starting in 1996, elec-
tions in New Zealand have followed an electoral formula that reduced the disproportionality
between votes and seats, thus increasing the number and importance of minor parties in the
country’s House of Representatives (Aimer 2014). Figure 1 presents the degree of dispro-
portionality, effective number of electoral parties, total number of parties and percentage
of seats won by smaller parties before and after the reform. While the degree of dispro-
portionality plummeted, the effective number of parties jumped from 2.16 to 3.76 between
1993 and 1996, mainly driven by the fact the share of seats by the smaller parties grew
from less than 5% in previous elections to approximately 30% after the reform. To better
assess the magnitude of this change, Figure 1 also presents the numbers for Australia, New
12 The extra seven seats were dedicated to Maori representation.
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Zealand’s most similar neighbor, which did not experience any major shifts in any of the
election indices during the same period.
Figure 2.1: Election Indices in New Zealand and Australia, 1990-2002
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While the Labour and National parties have always finished first and second, no
party has been able to win an absolute majority ever since. This break in party system
allows for an assessment of the impact the change in the number of parties had on atti-
tudes and behavior before and after the electoral reform. For the past three decades, the
New Zealand Election Study has conducted post-election surveys administered through a
self-completion mail-in questionnaire that explore, among different topics, public attitudes
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about representation, including since 1993 respondents’ feelings of political efficacy.13
To measure internal efficacy, participants were asked to indicate how much they
agreed or disagreed with the statement “Sometimes politics seems so complicated a person
like me can’t really understand what’s going on.” And to assess feelings of external efficacy,
the statement said “I don’t think politicians and public servants care much about what
people like me think.” Responses were measured in a 5-point scale in which 1 means
“Strongly agree” and 5 means “Strongly disagree”. Given the statement are negative, the
scale is also left in the negative direction to signify more efficacy. That is, those who say
they disagree with the statement believe they are more capable of understanding politics.
For each election survey, a portion of respondents from the previous study is carried through
making the data into a panel. For instance, 1173 randomly selected respondent in 1993 also
responded to the mail-in questionnaire in 1996.14 In the new panel in 1996, 1999 and 2002,
546 citizens responded to the questionnaire in all three waves.15
According to the mobilization and diversity of options arguments, there should be
an increase in feelings of efficacy among the general population after the election of more
parties in New Zealand. The theory posited here, however, suggests that the increase in
parties associated with the electoral rule should lead to a decrease in the mass public’s
feelings of internal efficacy, particularly from those with lower levels of education. Figure
2 presents the differences in responses to the efficacy by the same respondents weeks after
the 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002 general elections in New Zealand split into two panels.
The graph on the left indicates that while survey participants had, on average, higher
feelings of internal efficacy right after the first election under MMP, the level of efficacy
dropped back after the country experienced its first multiparty parliament (1997-1999),
13 More information about the studies can be found in the project’s website.
14 Questions about efficacy were not asked in 1990, the first wave of the study.
15 An important threat to internal validity in a panel study is potential bias from attrition. For example,
the attrition rate between the 1990-1993 panel study and 1996 was roughly 47%. However, to make sure
the attrition group is not different from those who continue to participate, I test for potential differences on
several measures, including the efficacy questions, and similar to the New Zealand Election Study’s own
assessment, do not find systematic differences between the sample across waves.
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Figure 2.2: Levels of Internal and External Efficacy, New Zealand 1993-2002
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and stayed low through the second multiparty parliament. More precisely, the average of
responses went up roughly .11 points from 1993 to 1996, but dropped back .12 points in
1999. The change in external efficacy was increasingly positive, nevertheless. In other
words, compared to responses given after the previous election, levels of disagreement
with the statement that politicians and public servants don’t care about ordinary citizens
increased substantially.
On top of looking at average change across time, we can also analyze variation
in opinion change between individuals. That is, while the average level may moved in
one direction, there might be important differences in feelings of efficacy over time across
respondents. In fact, the majority of respondents indicate an equivalent level of efficacy
across waves. According to my argument, the drop in efficacy levels associated with the
increasing the number of parties should be larger for those with lower levels of education.16
But to adequately make this comparison, it is important to control for possible confounding
factors that might be associated with education such as sex, age, religion, Maori ancestry,
16 Graphs with the distribution of responses in the 1993 and 1996 are presented in appendix B.
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region of the country one lives in, and country of birth. Hence, I run multivariate ordinary
least square regressions on the change of efficacy responses across time, and present the
average change for respondents with varying education levels after controlling for socio-
demographic characteristics in Figure 3.17
Figure 2.3: Change in Efficacy Across Time by Education Level, New Zealand 1993-1999
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The results indicate that for the most part there were not major differences in changes
of opinion between groups of varying levels of education, but the graph on the bottom
left shows that the general drop in internal efficacy between 1996 and 1999 was larger
among those with lower levels of educations. That is, individuals with no education and
primary education reported substantive drops in internal efficacy of roughly -.4 and -.2
17 Full regression results are presented in appendix B.
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across waves, respectively. On the other hand, those with secondary and post-secondary
education reported much smaller differences, which aligns with the expectation proposed
by here. Hence, the results suggests the increase in the number of parties in parliament
from 1993 through 1996 had somewhat heterogenous effects on groups of different educa-
tional attainment levels. In regards to the increase in external efficacy, there were not major
differences between these groups.18
As suggested in the beginning of this section, nevertheless, it is possible that changes
in feelings of efficacy were not a product of the increase in the number of parties in parlia-
ment given multiple political events were occurring in New Zealand during the 1990s. The
starting point of the time-series analyzed here was likely heavily influenced by the diffi-
culty of understanding the electoral formulas posed by the referendum, and the fact that the
major parties were opposed to the electoral commission’s proposal that gained popular sup-
port over time. In fact, levels of confidence on politicians and parties were extremely low
prior to the implementation of the new electoral system. Opinion polls in the early 1990s
showed that politicians were seen as untrustworthy as used car salespeople, the least trust-
worthy group of professionals (McCluskey 2008, Ministry of Culture and Heritage of New
Zealand 2016). Thus, in an attempt to further evaluate the relationship between number
of parties and individual efficacy while isolating confounding factors, I turn to a compar-
ison of efficacy levels between municipalities in Brazil with a larger and more varied set
of observations that allows for the testing of different dimensions of party competition and
inclusion of more statistical controls.19.
18 Yet, in a separate analysis, those who identified as supporters of any political party in 1993, roughly
60% of the sample, reported a slightly larger change in feelings of external efficacy than their non-partisan
counterparts in 1996, but this was neither statistically significant nor present between 1996 and 1999. In
2002 compared to 1999, however, those who identified with minor parties, approximately 17% of the sample,
reported a substantively greater change in external efficacy than non-partisans or those attached to the major
parties.
19 The comparison of elections across municipalities provides other common advantages of subnational
analysis such as inherent controls for national-level institutions and often better construct validity for the
variables of interest (Snyder 2001, Hiskey and Bowler 2005)
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2.3.2 Municipal Level Comparisons in Brazil
My argument proposes that context-level factors that require more cognitive ef-
forts from individuals to grasp political information should be associated with lower levels
of internal efficacy. Aside from the number of parties, the extent to which parties are not
institutionalized, and the extent to which differences between parties are not clear should
negatively impact the degree of difficulty ordinary individuals face to differentiate and eval-
uate parties. Consequently, when these dimensions that form the structure of party compe-
tition increase the complexity of the informational environment, they lead to lower levels
of efficacy, particularly among those with lower levels of education.
Local elections in Brazil provide an ideal setting to explore the effects of the config-
uration of electoral options on people’s efficacy beliefs because they are partisan, concur-
rent, compulsory, and they offer a great deal of variation in the number and type of parties
with candidates across mayoral races (Renno´ 2004). 20 Hence, I see this comparison as
an opportunity to test the hypotheses about the impact of more competitors in elections
on the public’s perception of efficacy. To do so, I use a multilevel analysis of a survey
item that captures internal efficacy beliefs at the municipal level with data from the Amer-
icasBarometer 2014 Brazil survey and campaign-level information from the 2012 mayoral
elections.21 The survey interviewed respondents from a total of 107 municipalities selected
based on a multi-stage population probability sampling method.22 Similar to the previous
20 Municipal elections are held every four years with the possibility of reelection for a second term for
mayors, and no term limits for local councilmen. Elections for president and state-level positions are held in
the off-years of local elections.
21 As the selection of households within municipalities is conducted by clusters (blocks), it should be
noted that respondents at the municipal level tend to be from the same neighborhood. This could potentially
introduce bias into the municipal-level estimates. Yet, if the selection of neighborhoods was random as
intended, or at least orthogonal to the characteristics of the municipality’s election, this method of selection
should lead to increased variance due to random measurement error but not systematic bias, which should only
increases the probability of a false negative due to measurement error, but not erroneous point estimates (King,
Keohane and Verba 1994). Furthermore, the large number of municipalities should reduce the probability of a
false positive by chance, again assuming the block selection is not correlated with the municipality’s electoral
features and latent levels of efficacy.
22 The sample of municipalities covers all five regions of country and 21 out of the 27 states. Brazil’s
capital Brası´lia is dropped from the analysis given it does not have a mayor.
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analysis, the question asks respondents about perceptions of their own ability to understand
political issue, but highlights the level of government being asked about: “You feel that you
understand the most important political issues of the municipality. How much do you agree
or disagree with this statement?” Responses were recorded on a seven-point scale in which
higher values characterize beliefs of higher levels of efficacy.
It should be noted that I am implicitly theorizing that feelings of internal efficacy re-
garding national-level and local-level politics are both influenced by the number of electoral
options. This does not mean the relationship between electoral competition and efficacy is
the same across level, nor that the experiences and evaluations that lead to efficacy beliefs
are equal at the different levels. The idea here is simply that variation in internal efficacy
beliefs at the local level is influenced by the political informational environment across
municipalities.
In quantifying the amount of electoral options offered in each election, similar to
Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005), I measure both the total number of candidates in the
election, as well as a weighted number of candidates based on the distribution of votes
received by each candidate, also known as effective number of parties (ENP) (Laakso and
Taagepera 1979).23 While the two measures correlate moderately, the effective number
of parties reduces the range of variation by curtailing the right side of the distribution
due to the calibration for large differences in electoral results.24 On the other hand, the
crude measure of the total number of parties gives more weight to elections with multiple
23 ENP is calculated with the following formula: ENP=1/∑ni p2i , in which i indicates a party and pi indi-
cates the proportion of votes/seats won by that party. For instance, if all legislature seats are shared equally
between three parties, the “effective” number of parties would be 3, but if one party has 50% of the seats and
the other two 25% each, the “effective” number of parties would equal 2.67. In the original article, the authors
suggest the effective number of parties can be calculated with either the distribution of votes in the election
or the share of seats in the legislature. Alternative measures to ENP focus on the “hyperfractionalization”
(Widgen 1971) and size of the largest party (Molinar 1991).
24 This is especially the case with the sample of cities in this analysis. Given the probability of a munic-
ipality is selected to the study is proportional to its population size, the sample includes a higher proportion
of large municipalities than in the population of municipalities, consequently comprising elections with more
candidates than the average national distribution. For a comparison between the distribution of candidates
between all municipalities and the sample selected in the study, see appendix B.
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candidates by keeping a wider range between the ends of the distribution.25
Based on the idea that party labels can facilitate potential voters’ processing of
the political informational environment, I operationalize institutionalization of parties at
the municipal-level with a count of the number of mayoral candidates from the Workers’
Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). While Brazil’s party sys-
tem was considered weak and inchoate during the first decade of its latest transition to
democracy in 1985 (Mainwaring 1999, Ames 2001), toward the end of the 1990’s, the PT
and PSDB emerged to the national stage as representatives of a left-right cleavage. In the
words of a report by IDEA (2011, p. 50) on programmatic parties around the world, “the
two most important parties in the story of Brazil’s increasing programmatization are the
PT and PSDB, which together crowded out clientelistic parties and acted as the bases for
coalitions of the left and right.” The PT became nationally known for being the only strong
programmatic party that developed an institutionalized national organization (Hunter 2010,
Samuels 2004), and for having the highest proportion of party identifiers in the population
(Samuels 2006).26 The PSDB, on the other hand, became known for having a clear pol-
icymaking record due to the stabilization of inflation and implementation of government
reforms during its tenure in the presidency from 1995-2001 with President Cardoso, and
for being the center-right opposition to the PT in the last four presidential elections won
by President Lula da Silva in 2002 and 2004, and President Dilma Rousseff in 2008 and
2012 (Samuels and Zucco 2014).27 Therefore, the prominence the party labels gained in
the 1990’s and their repeated disputes for the presidency in over two decades provide in-
dividuals with clear and accessible information about the parties’ ideologies and tracking
records, making the informational environment simpler for citizens if mayoral candidates
from these parties were running.28
25 In the sample of municipalities analyzed here, no elections went uncontested (i.e. one-candidate races).
26 While the proportion of PT identifiers (known as petistas) vary by polls, it tends to range between 15
to 30% of the population, which is at least double the number of identifiers of any other party.
27 The PT presidential candidate was never able to win a majority in the first-round, thus always taking
the presidential race to a round-off and an extra month of intense competition between the PT and PSDB.
28 Similar to the approach by Stewart et al. (1992) who use dissimilarity between party systems as a
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Comparably, I measure lack of clarity between options with a dummy that indicates
if the PT and PSDB joined a coalition with each other or with non-ideologically-aligned
parties leftist PC do B or rightist DEM, or with the national-level catch-all party PMDB.29
The logic behind this measure is that party brands can lose their meaning when converging
with former rival parties and hence increasing the difficulty of understanding the position
of these coalitions’ candidates (Lupu 2013). The expectation is that in municipalities where
the local PT or PSDB brands have been diluted due to non-ideological coalitions, differ-
entiating between candidates becomes more complicated; consequently demanding more
cognitive efforts from potential electors.30
In addition to these four variables capturing the structure of the local-level’s polit-
ical competition, I include a dummy for elections in which the incumbent candidate was
running for re-election, a measure for size of municipality, average size of coalitions, and
dummies for the country’s five main regions.31 At the individual-level, the models include
sex, age, level of education, urban-rural divide, ethnicity, partisanship, wealth quintiles,
and the preceding internal efficacy question that asks about understanding issues at the
national-level. This measure serves as an important control because it helps differentiate
what is a product of feelings of efficacy at the national and local level.32 Table 1 presents
results of four hierarchical level regression models, of which the original and weighted
useful proxy of the degree of differentiation between political contexts, this measure can be interpreted as the
degree of congruency of options between presidential and mayoral elections, which again should facilitate
understanding of local level politics.
29 In the sample of municipalities analyzed here, the PT and PSDB did not form any coalitions, seldom
coalesced with the non-ideological-aligned parties, but more often partnered with the centrist PMDB.
30 Both of these measures assume that most mayoral candidates do not hold political preferences widely
different from their parties’ platforms, which is not a strong assumption given high rates of party-switching
in Brazil, proliferation of minor non-ideological parties, and the PT and PSDB’s strong organization nation-
wide. Consequently, in the case of disagreements between potential candidates or parties, potential candidates
could easily switch to another party or even be kept from running from party elites.
31 Mayoral elections in Brazil also differ in format according to the size of the electorate. Elections in
municipalities with fewer than 200,000 registered voters are single member plurality (first-past-the-post),
whereas elections in municipalities with 200,000 or more voters are majoritarian with a potential runoff.
For this reason, I also run the regressions presented in Table 1 but only with municipalities with fewer than
200,000 voters. The results are consistent and presented in appendix B.
32 Including the national-level efficacy measure in the right side of the equation means the dependent
variable captures the difference between the national and local level efficacy responses.
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number of candidates variables are introduced separately at first, and then together in the
last model.
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Table 2.1: Hierarchical Linear Models of Internal Efficacy across Municipalities, Brazil
2014
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Internal efficacy (national) 0.686∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Female −0.162∗ −0.162∗ −0.162∗ −0.162∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No formal education −0.738∗∗∗ −0.730∗∗∗ −0.730∗∗∗ −0.740∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193)
Secondary education 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.104
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Post-Secondary education 0.432∗∗ 0.448∗∗ 0.447∗∗ 0.431∗∗
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
Urban −0.209 −0.232 −0.226 −0.212
(0.137) (0.142) (0.142) (0.138)
Wealth Quintiles Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of candidates −0.091∗ −0.100∗
(0.041) (0.045)
ENC (centered) −0.033 0.019 0.036
(0.071) (0.115) (0.076)
ENC (centered)2 −0.024
(0.042)
Incumbent 0.104 0.108 0.104 0.116
(0.097) (0.103) (0.104) (0.100)
Institutionalized parties 0.081 0.058 0.060 0.080
(0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
Average size of coalition −0.083∗∗ −0.046 −0.041 −0.082∗
(0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032)
Non-ideological coalitions −0.129 −0.123 −0.125 −0.124
(0.106) (0.110) (0.111) (0.107)
Size of Municipality (5 cat.) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region categories (5 cat.) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 1.976∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗ 1.960∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.332) (0.342) (0.371)
Num. obs. 1429 1429 1429 1429
Num. municipalities 104 104 104 104
Var. (municipalities) 0.061 0.074 0.075 0.063
Var. Residual 1.536 1.535 1.535 1.537
Source: AmericasBarometer Brazil 2014 and Brazil’s Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
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The individual-level predictors mirror results from previous studies: males and
more educated individuals display higher levels of internal efficacy at the local level. While
those with no formal education show levels of efficacy .74 points lower than those who
completed primary school, on average, those who completed post-secondary report lev-
els .43 points higher compared to the same group. These differences across groups holds
even when controlling for the measure at the national level. That is, males and those more
educated feel they are better able to understand politics in their municipality than their fe-
male and less educated counterparts even when they have the same level of national-level
efficacy.
In regard to the second-level predictors, the first and last models indicate that in
municipalities where there are more mayoral candidates, individuals become less confi-
dent about their ability to understand local political issues. In other words, controlling for
the size of municipality, average size of coalitions, presence of candidates from the ma-
jor parties and other factors, as the number of candidates is larger, the average reported
level of internal efficacy is lower.33 The size of the decrease associated with a large num-
ber of candidates is meaningful when we consider the range in the number of candidates.
According to the first model, an election with 5 additional candidates is associated with
an average drop of roughly .45 in internal efficacy, a change larger than the difference in
efficacy between individuals who completed primary and post-secondary education.
Models 2 and 3 indicate that variation in internal efficacy beliefs across municipal-
ities is only slightly associated with the weighted measure of the number of candidates.34
33 Similar results are found when dividing the number of candidates variable into a set of dummies. The
gap in average levels of internal efficacy widens as the number of candidates grow. The full regression table
is presented in appendix B.
34 The squared term in model 3 indicates that a one unit change in the effective number of candidates is
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This non-significant result suggests that important variation in efficacy across municipal-
ities is explained by elections with large number of candidates. Given the measure’s ad-
justment by distribution of votes, the effective number of candidates for elections with a
large number total number of candidates but not highly contested elections would be much
closer to more contested elections with few candidates. For instance, a six-candidate elec-
tion split 54%, 22%, 11%, 07%, 04%, and 02% has about the same effective number of
candidates (2.816) from a three-candidate race split 46%, 30%, 24%. Thus, the weighting
process from the calculation of effective number of parties reduces the power from non-
closely-disputed elections with more candidates. The last model disentangles the two and
shows that a larger total number of candidates is associated with lower levels of efficacy
even when controlling for the distribution of votes.35
The models also indicate only a limited importance of incumbency and party labels
for voters’ feeling of efficacy. While both elections in which the incumbent is running for
re-election and elections in which the more institutionalized parties introduce their own
candidates are associated with slightly higher levels of efficacy, the coefficients do not
reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Similarly, levels of efficacy are not
statistically significantly lower in municipalities where the major parties coalesced with
parties not ideologically-aligned.
The cross-level interaction hypothesis stipulates that the negative effect of more
candidates should be larger for individuals with lower levels of education. Hence, I model
differences in efficacy between respondents of varying levels of educational attainment as
associated with increasingly larger, though not significant, drops in efficacy. A plot of the varying effect of
effective number of candidates across is presented in appendix B.
35 Alternatively, the coefficient for the effective number of candidates should be interpreted as the rela-
tionship between competition and efficacy when controlling for the total number of candidates.
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a function of the same municipal level predictors. That is, I treat the differences in efficacy
between groups of varying educational attainment as random variables that are explained
by variation in municipality size, geographic region and structure of party competition in
that municipality.36 Figure 4 presents the estimated change in efficacy associated with the
addition of an extra candidate to a mayoral race for the four different levels of education,
holding other factors constant.37
Figure 2.4: Heterogenous Effects of Number of Candidates by Education Level, Brazil
2014
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The coefficients from the cross-level interactions indicate that a mayoral race with
an extra candidate is associate with a significant negative change in efficacy for on indi-
viduals who completed primary and secondary school, but not on those with no formal
education and those who completed post-secondary education.38 Another way to interpret
36 Mathematically this means the beta for education become a second dependent variable of the model,
β01 = γ10 + γ1kZ + u j, in which β01 is the estimated relationship for education, γ10 is the average change in
efficacy, γ1k stands for the coefficients of Z second-level predictors, and u j is the residual.
37 Full regression results are presented in appendix B.
38 The unexpected point estimate and large confidence interval for the group with no formal education is
explained by the small number of cases (51, or 3.5% of the sample).
31
this interaction is that the difference in efficacy between those with primary or secondary
education and those with a degree higher than primary widens as the number of candidates
increase, which conforms with the expectations of my theory. Likewise, the presence of a
candidate from the institutionalized parties is associate with a positive change in efficacy
mainly for those who completed primary education, but not as much for those with higher
educational degrees. Therefore, the results suggest that the impact of arrangements that
reduce the complexity of informational environment is larger for those with lower levels of
education.
The two analyses presented thus far provide some evidence in favor of a negative
relationship between a crowded political environment and individuals’ attitudes about their
ability to understand political issues. In the next section, I evaluate the extent to which
the results from the analyses in New Zealand and Brazil represent a pattern that can be
generalized to a cross-national setting.
2.3.3 Cross-National Comparisons in Latin America and the Caribbean
To make the comparison of feelings of efficacy across countries, I use 91 na-
tionally representative surveys conducted from 2008 and 2012 in over 25 countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean by the AmericasBarometer project. The surveys evaluated re-
spondents’ level of internal and external efficacy by asking the extent to which they agreed
with the following sentences: “You feel that you understand the most important political
issues of the country” and “Those who govern this country are interested in what people
like you think.” While responses were measured in a 7-point scale ranging from “strongly
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disagree” to “strongly agree”, average scores by country in internal efficacy ranged from
3.18 in the 2010 Paraguayan survey to approximately 4.51 in Venezuela 2014.39 I combine
the 91 surveys to estimate the relationship between the structure of competition between
parties and variation in efficacy scores across respondents and surveys with three-level hi-
erarchical models. Respondents are clustered within surveys, which are clustered within
countries. As I treat the survey as the second-level unit of analysis, the shared character-
istics of surveys from the same country are accounted by the third-level intercepts. The
assumption here though is that the surveys are random draws of a population of survey that
do not follow any specific order.40
To avoid the impact of having outliers, such as Brazil with its 20+ plus parties in
the lower house, I operationalize the fragmentation of a country’s party system with the
national-level effective number of legislative parties (ENLP), which weighs the number of
parties according to their share of seats in the lower or only legislative body (Laakso and
Taagepera 1979).41 Party system institutionalization is measured with the Pedersen’s index
of electoral volatility, which uses the net change of votes across two elections to assess
a degree of stability in the system (Pedersen 1979).42 Similar to the subnational analysis
in Brazil, the rationale behind the measure is that in systems where parties have strong
39 The United States 2012 actually yielded the highest average score (5.13), but like Canada, responses
from the U.S. are not part of the analysis due to missing variables that are included in the regression models.
40 That is, surveys of the same country are assumed to be independent and identically distributed, thus,
interchangeable among themselves.
41 Given the surveys were not purposively conducted near or distant from elections, I choose to use the
effective number of parties by seats rather than votes because the salience of the fragmentation is more or
less constant across periods between elections. There is also better information on the distribution of seats in
legislatures than electoral results across countries, especially in federal countries where the counting of votes
for legislative bodies is done at the state level.
42 The formula for the Pedersen Index is as follows: Volatility= ∑ni |pit − pi(t+1)|/2, in which i indicates
a party and pit indicates the proportion of votes won by that party. For surveys conducted in 2008 and 2010,
I use the electoral volatility scores calculated by Alca´ntara (2012), and for surveys conducted in 2012 and
2014, I use my own estimates due to missing data.
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roots in society and present stable platforms for the population across time, the amount
of change in party vote across elections should be small. On the other hand, in systems
where individuals are not presented with stable options and parties are constantly changing
positions, the volatility of votes should be high.43
To measure the degree of polarization between parties, or distinctiveness of posi-
tions, it is necessary to estimate the position of parties across one or more political di-
mensions.44 Scholars have used different sources of information to estimate the position of
parties in a left-right scale such as parties’ political manifesto (e.g. Maoz and Somer-Topc¸u
2010), surveys of legislators (e.g. Power and Zucco 2009), the opinion of country experts
(e.g. Lupu 2015a), survey respondents’ placement of the parties (e.g. Dalton 2008), and
roll-call votes (e.g. Hetherington 2001).45 I use a measure of polarization calculated by
Singer (2016), which estimates the positions of the parties based on surveys of legislators
in 17 Latin American countries conducted by the Representative Institutions Observatory
(OIR) Project from the University of Salamanca. The positions of the parties are generated
based on the left-right placement of their legislators, which are then used to calculate the
distance between individual parties from the party system’s center (average position of all
parties weighted by their size).46 Figure 5 presents how countries in Latin America and
43 Moreover, electoral volatility correlates well with other measures of institutionalization such as mea-
sures of party volatility, entry of new parties, and the Varieties of Democracy project’s indicators of institu-
tionalization.
44 Standard measures of polarization assume that parties have a single peakedness preference positions in
a left-right scale individuals can observe and use for comparisons.
45 As Dalton, Farrell and McAllister (2011) indicate these different approaches to coding ideological
positions tend to yield similar results. For a discussion of polarization measures and an example of their
applicability, see Alvarez and Nagler (2004) and Ezrow (2007), respectively.
46 The formula for the calculation of distance is: Polarization=
√
∑ni pi(LRi− LˆR)2, in which i indicates
a party, pi indicates the proportion of votes/seats won by that party, LRi indicates the position of the party in
the left-right spectrum of votes/seats, and LˆR indicates the average position of parties weighted by their sizes.
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Caribbean fare in these three party system characteristics in 2010.
Figure 2.5: Party System Characteristics of Latin American Countries, 2010
The map on the left presents the effective number of parties per country, and shows
that Honduras and Bolivia have the lowest effective number of parties, while Argentina
and Brazil have the highest. The middle map displays the high degree of institutionaliza-
tion in stable party systems such as Chile and Uruguay, but low values in volatile systems
like Guatemala and Colombia.47 Polarization, on the other hand, is particularly high in
countries with leftist presidents such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua.
To control for possible confounding factors, I include in the models the logged num-
ber of seats in the lower chamber or only legislature, dummies for bicameral and federal
countries, inverted Freedom House scores, Human Development Index scores, the number
of years since the last democracy transition since 1963, the logged number of months away
from the closest election in the country, and a set of dummies for different years. At the
47 Venezuela actually has the highest value of volatility in 2010 given the opposition decided not to run in
the previous legislative election in 2005 due to alleged fraud in the process.
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individual-level, the model includes sex, age, level of education, and urban-rural divide.48
Table 2 presents the results of three regression models for internal and external efficacy
each. The first and second models do not include the measures of institutionalization and
polarization as predictors due to missing values.49 The second model differs from the first
by allowing for a curvilinear relationship between the effective number of parties and aver-
age levels of internal efficacy. Finally, the third regression estimates the relationship with a
smaller number of observations but includes institutionalization and polarization as a part
of the model.
48 Due to the difficulty of having a valid measure of wealth across countries, I choose not to include any
direct measure of economic status here. Nonetheless, robustness checks show that the results are unchanged
when the standard wealth quintiles measure is included in the models. Furthermore, because the surveys in
the United States and Canada were conducted by telephone, the dataset does not include similar categories of
urbanization. For this reason, category ”Question not asked” is labeled as NA.
49 The absence of polarization and institutionalization do not have a major effect on the direction of the
estimated effect of party system fragmentation because they are only slightly correlated in this sample. For
the correlation scores, see appendix B.
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Table 2.2: Hierarchical Linear Models of Efficacy, AmericasBarometer 2008-2014
Internal Efficacy External Efficacy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Male 0.389∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005 0.021
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Age 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No formal education −0.128∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.060 0.091∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037)
Secondary education 0.320∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Post-Secondary education 0.796∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
Educ. (DK/NA) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Urban (NA) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ENLP (centered) −0.037 −0.108∗ −0.097∗ −0.046 −0.146∗ −0.104∗∗
(0.021) (0.047) (0.040) (0.032) (0.071) (0.037)
ENLP (centered)2 0.011 0.016
(0.007) (0.010)
Electoral volatility 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
Polarization 0.064 0.137
(0.073) (0.077)
Federal 0.011 −0.058 −0.440 −0.299 −0.393 −1.167∗∗
(0.189) (0.194) (0.421) (0.270) (0.285) (0.368)
Bicameral −0.125 −0.152 −0.334 0.101 0.064 0.050
(0.100) (0.102) (0.174) (0.142) (0.149) (0.153)
Seats (log) −0.088 −0.083 0.352 0.175 0.181 0.691∗∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.255) (0.143) (0.146) (0.225)
Freedom House −0.028 −0.035 −0.035 −0.039 −0.049 0.034
(0.032) (0.032) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) (0.070)
Age of Democracy 0.002 0.001 0.006 −0.003 −0.004 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Human Development Index 1.503 1.865 3.444 1.587 2.100 3.777
(1.010) (1.031) (2.047) (1.464) (1.527) (2.174)
No. months near election (log) −0.035 −0.035 0.025 −0.027 −0.027 0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.043)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 2.784∗∗∗ 2.672∗∗∗ −0.772 2.350∗ 2.209∗ −2.713
(0.685) (0.693) (1.829) (0.981) (1.016) (1.656)
Num. obs. 147853 147853 81456 148049 148049 81474
Num. surveys 91 91 49 91 91 49
Num. countries 24 24 16 24 24 16
Var. surveys 0.035 0.034 0.021 0.085 0.082 0.076
Var. countries 0.039 0.040 0.053 0.076 0.083 0.017
Var. Residual 3.111 3.111 2.992 3.696 3.696 3.613
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008-2014, Alca´ntara (2012), Singer (2016), UNDP, Freedom House, and information collected by the author.
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The coefficients at the individual level again show that males and those with higher
levels of education tend to have higher confidence in their ability to understand political
issues. Across the first three models, the estimated relationship between the ENLP and
average levels of internal efficacy is negative, which corroborates the cognitive demand-
ing hypothesis and contradicts the diversity and competition arguments. Furthermore, the
coefficient is significantly different from 0 in models 2 and 3, and also of considerable
magnitude. Using the third model as reference, holding the institutional and development
variables constant, a change of 4 units in the effective number of parties represents more
than the average difference between those who completed primary and secondary school.
The second model indicates that the effect of more parties does not follow an inverted-J
curve, but rather a diminishing negative effect across the range of parties. More precisely,
because the ENLP variable is centered at 2, the model estimates that the average change in
efficacy associated with increasing from two to three effective number of parties would be
-.108, while the average change in efficacy associated with increasing from three to four
would be -.086, and so on.50
The results also indicate the number of effective parties is the only national-level
predictor that is statistically significant. But putting statistical significance aside for a mo-
ment to analyze the directions of the other macro-level predictors, with the exception of
electoral volatility and Freedom House scores, they tend to fall in the direction of more
complex political systems reducing levels of efficacy. That is, the third model indicates
that levels of efficacy are, on average, lower in bicameral, federal, less developed, and
50 Given I centered ENLP at 2 and estimated as a curvilinear the relationship, the marginal effect is
calculated as follows: βENLP +2∗βENLP2 ENLPi.
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countries with newer democracies. Models 4 through 6 also contrast with the idea that
individuals feel their voices are of interest to those in power in countries where the number
of parties is larger. In fact, model 5 and 6 point in the opposite direction: in countries with
more parties, individuals seem to feel less represented. However, higher levels of external
efficacy seem to be somewhat associated with economic development as indicated by the
coefficients for HDI, though the coefficient does not always reach a levels of significance
(alpha) below .1. Lastly, I also test for heterogenous effects of fragmented party systems
on groups of varying levels of education by including cross-level interactions between the
education-level categories and the macro-level predictors of the first model.51 Figure 5
presents the estimated impact of an additional unit in the effective number of parties for the
different groups of educational attainment.
Figure 2.6: Heterogenous Effects of ENLP by Education Level, AmericasBarometer 2008-
2014
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51 Results of hierarchical linear regression are presented in appendix B.
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Similar to previous results, the negative change in efficacy associated with more
parties is larger for those who completed primary or secondary education than those who
have completed post-secondary school. While the difference between coefficients is not
statistically significant, the estimated impact of more options is nearly null among those
with post-secondary education, and farther from 0 among those with primary and secondary
education. We can also interpret the results as indication of a widening gap in internal
efficacy between those with post-secondary and those with not as the number of parties in
a country increases.52
2.4 Discussion
In this chapter I have put forth a theory of how characteristics of the political sys-
tem, especially features of party competition such as the number of electoral options and
parties in the legislature, may affect the complexity of politics for citizens, which then af-
fects the extent to which they feel they can understand and participate in politics. I also
argued that because cognitive resources are crucial for absorbing and processing political
information, the increasing levels of complexity of politics have a larger negative impact
on the efficacy of those with lower levels of education. This argument stands in opposition
to the diversity of options and mobilization hypotheses that predict higher levels of efficacy
when the number of electoral options is larger.
Exploring this point of tension between these diametrically-opposed views, I inves-
tigate the relationship between number of parties at the macro-level and feelings of politi-
52 In other words, the difference in average levels of internal efficacy between those who have completed
a post-secondary degree and those who have not seems to increase as the effective number of parties is larger.
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cal efficacy with three independent datasets. Overall, the results from all tests suggest that
perceptions of one’s capacity to understand political issues weakens when there are more
parties competing, particularly for individuals with lower levels of education. It should be
noted that the results from the analysis in New Zealand suggest the extent to which indi-
viduals perceived those in government to be interested in their opinion improved when the
country changed its electoral rule to be more proportional and consequently minor parties
gained importance in national politics. But the extent to which this is a function of the
increase of parties is difficult to tell. A comparison of external efficacy levels across Latin
American and Caribbean countries with different systems does not yield the same result,
indicating the New Zealand result possibly had to do with factors specific to that context.
In the next chapter, I dedicate more attention to the impact of the change in party system
in New Zealand, and to differences between municipalities in Brazil, by analyzing rates of
voter turnout as a behavioral implication of varying levels of political efficacy.
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Chapter 3
Number of Electoral Options and Voter Turnout: Direction and Mechanisms
3.1 Number of Options and Turnout: When Less is More
Perhaps the main reason for why some scholars assume that a larger number of
parties has a positive impact on individual efficacy is the association between the propor-
tionality of an electoral formula and level of voter turnout.1 Compared to proportional
formulas, first-past-the-post elections have lower levels of electoral participation because
they de-incentivize individuals who do not support parties that stand a chance of winning
from turning out (Duverger 1954, Lijphart 1997, Powell 1986).2 At the same time, because
individuals are strategic in supporting parties that stand a chance of winning, winner-takes-
all elections incentivize ideologically similar parties to converge in order to increase their
chances of electing candidates into office, which often leads to the reduction in the number
of parties (Cox 1997, Duverger 1954).3
The concurrent impact of electoral formula on number of parties and turnout seem
to have led scholars to assume that individuals feel more politically efficacious in contexts
with more parties. However, as Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) and Blais (2006) point out,
the literature provides limited evidence regarding the mechanisms for why proportional
1 Early research estimated the difference in turnout rates between majoritarian and proportional electoral
formulas to be around 9-12 percentage points (Blais and Carty 1990, Burnham 1987, Lijphart 1999).
2 For example, Fujiwara (2011) finds that in comparison to single ballot first-past-the-post mayoral elec-
tions in Brazil, dual-ballot (run-off) elections promote more votes for the third-place candidates and slightly
increase turnout.
3 This phenomenon is often called Duverger’s Law. In a more recent version of this theory, Cox (1997)
argues that the number of parties in a system is a function of the number of seats allocated to that district plus
one.
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elections are associated with higher participation levels. Blais (2006, p.118) goes as far as
to say that “we have a poor understanding of the relationship between the number of parties
and turnout.” Rather than higher individual efficacy promoted by more parties, I argue this
positive association between number of parties and turnout is driven by a spurious corre-
lation in which both participation levels and number of parties are negatively affected by
the degree of disproportionality of the electoral formula. Hence, I dispute mechanisms that
suggest that more parties lead to higher levels of voter turnout. On the contrary, participa-
tion levels are higher in proportional elections because citizens know their ballots are less
likely to go “wasted” than under disproportional electoral formulas (Duverger 1954).4 The
disproportionality of an electoral formula is not only different from the number of parties,
but actually one of its causes (Duverger 1954, Cox 1997, Taagepera and Shugart 1989).
Therefore, because the disproportionality of an electoral formula leads to a reduction of
parties competing for office and lower levels of electoral participation, it is assumed that
the positive correlation between number of electoral options and turnout is a product of an
isolated effect.
Figure 3.1: Relationship between Number of Electoral Options and Voter Turnout
Assumed Effect
Number of Options Voter Turnout
+
Spurious Relationship
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−
Recent studies also contradict the idea that proportional elections promote higher
turnout due to increased mobilization efforts or a more diverse set of electoral options
4 In non-competitive first-past-the-post elections, like most U.S. states in presidential elections, even
potential voters of large parties have little incentive to vote given the chances of affecting the result are
minimal (Downs 1957).
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that appeal to the general public’s preferences. Rainey (2015) argues that political parties
actually have more incentives to spend efforts toward voter mobilization in competitive
first-past-the-post elections given a small change in the distribution of votes can alter the
entire outcome of an election, while a small change in proportional elections is unlikely
to lead to major shifts in the allocation of seats. Blais and Bodet (2006) find that there is
not higher congruency in ideology between the citizens and parties under PR systems. Fur-
thermore, Blais and Carty (1990), Blais and Dobrzynska (1998), Jackman (1987), Jackman
and Miller (1995) address the problem of convoluting disproportionality with number of
parties by using multivariate regression on a large sample of elections across countries and
find that while the degree of proportionality in elections are indeed associated with higher
electoral participation, an increase in the effective number of parties significantly depresses
turnout.56 Finally, experimental studies in the U.S. by Lau and Redlawsk (2001), Lau and
Redlawsk (2006) and in Brazil by Cunow (2014) also find that in scenarios with a larger
choice set of candidates, individuals are less likely to participate in elections, to acquire
information, and to choose the “correct” candidate.7
But while both set of studies dispute the idea that more choices promote electoral
participation, they diverge in the reason why the relationship is negative. Jackman (1987)
argues that more parties depresses turnout because electors feel de-incentivized from vot-
ing when they know that the agenda they are voting for will not be exactly what will be
5 Blais and Carty (1990) actually find the effect to be slightly curvilinear in which the marginal effect of
more parties to be smaller when the number of parties is already large.
6 It should be noted that, in contrast to these studies that mostly use data from industrialized nations, a
few studies find the relationship between number of parties and turnout to be null in Latin America (Fornos,
Power and Garand 2004, Pe´rez-Lina´n 2001) and Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007).
7 Power and Roberts (1995) and Cohen (2016) also find a larger number of candidates to be a predictor
of null votes in Brazil and Latin America, respectively.
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implemented by parties given compromises they often make when forming coalitions in the
aftermath of elections.8 In other words, because multiparty systems often lead to coalition
governments, individuals have less incentive to participate because parties will likely not
follow through with their campaign promises.9 In fact, Armstrong and Duch (2010) and
Bowler, Donovan and Karp (2010) find evidence that individuals anticipate the formation
of post-election coalitions in Europe and New Zealand, which in turn affects their voting
calculus.
In contrast to the coalition-formation mechanism, Lau and Redlawsk (2001), Lau
and Redlawsk (2006) and Cunow (2014) explain lower levels of participation in multi-
candidate scenarios based on increasing cognitive demands from ordinary citizens and
potential information overload. In other words, similar to the theory posited in this dis-
sertation, this set of studies argues that the burden on ordinary individuals to absorb and
process a larger amount of information leads them to disengage when faced with increas-
ingly complex environments. The main difference between their explanations and the one
presented here is the mediation of internal efficacy as the mechanism for which potential
electors become less likely to turnout.
In this chapter, I seek to answer these two questions regarding the direction of the
relationship and validity of mechanisms regarding the relationship between more political
competitors and turnout. First, what is the independent impact of more electoral options
on voter turnout? The observable implication of the diversity of options and mobilization
8 Jackman is actually inspired by Downs (1957, p.155) who states that multiparty systems offer potential
voters with a less definite choice set due to ambiguity and compromise introduced on a second level in which
parties, not voters, decide the formation of government.
9 Although Blais and Carty (1990) and Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) mention that the greater the number
of parties, the more complex the system for electors to choose from, they follow Jackman’s (1987) post-
election coalition-formation argument.
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arguments is that, all else equal, levels of turnout should increase as the number of elec-
toral options increase. On the other hand, a set of works suggest the addition of more
parties de-motivates electoral participation due to coalitions and increased complexity in
the informational environment.
Second, how do competing explanations for the negative effect of more parties fare
in explaining lower levels of turnout? While cognition-oriented explanations argue that
turnout is lower because the mass public feel less efficacious in contexts with multiple
parties, Jackman’s (1987) argument states that individuals feel de-incentivized from voting
due to the formation of coalitions post-election. Given the latter explanation relies on
the individuals’ perception of the size and type of coalition parties are forming, I seek to
estimate the role of each mechanism by accounting for the influence of different types of
coalitions on levels of turnout across municipal elections in Colombia and Brazil.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
To assess the direction and validity of these mechanisms, I conduct three analy-
ses of voter turnout. First, I compare participation rates across mayoral elections in Colom-
bia where voting is voluntary and coalitions at the subnational level have only recently been
permitted. Second, I turn to an analysis of turnout levels across mayoral elections in Brazil,
where voting is compulsory and coalitions at the municipal-level have been recurrent for
nearly three decades. Finally, I look at variation in turnout in New Zealand before and
after the transformation of the electoral system from first-past-the-post (FPTP) to mixed-
member proportional (MMP). The latter two complement the previous chapter’s analysis
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of efficacy levels across time in New Zealand and across municipalities in Brazil.
3.2.1 Mayoral Elections in Colombia
While most studies of turnout tend to look at differences across countries, com-
parisons at the subnational level are useful because they inherently control for differences
in electoral rules, timing of elections and other national-level factors such situation of the
economy and national government policies. Moreover, Colombia is a useful case because
not only there is wide variation in the number of candidates and levels of turnout across
municipalities, but the formation of coalitions during the nomination of candidates in sub-
national elections has recently been sanctioned.10
In 2011, the Colombian Congress passed the “Political Parties Law” (Ley de los
partidos polticos) that stipulated new rules regarding campaign finance, internal regulations
for parties, gender quotas, and other changes to the electoral system including the formation
of coalitions between parties in sub-national elections. This recent change provides an
opportunity to assess the effect of more electoral options on turnout with and without the
formation of coalitions. That is, because parties could not form coalitions prior to the 2011
elections, it is possible to evaluate if the relationship between the number of candidates and
turnout changed before and after the electoral change.11
It is important to note, however, that the new set of rules was approved by the
country’s legislative body only 108 days before the 2011 mayoral elections, and actually
10 The distribution of turnout rates across municipalities in Colombia is presented in appendix C.
11 Sub-national elections in Colombia take place every four years. Elections for governor, mayor and local
councilmen are concomitant, while elections for president and senators always take place in the year after.
Governors and mayors cannot run for reelection.
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signed into law only 28 days before election day, which left many local leaders confused
about the application of some rules, particularly regarding the gender quota and registration
of candidates (Puyana 2012). Not surprisingly, then, the introduction of the new rules seem
to have had only a small impact on the distribution of number of candidates across mayoral
elections in 2007 and 2011 (Basset and Garbijas 2015). The average number of candidates
per race dropped from 4.21 to 4.02, although the number of candidates across years was
unchanged in one-fifth of elections, and varied by only one in roughly one-third.12
Figure 3.2: Number of Mayoral Candidate across Municipalities, Colombia 2007-2011
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Moreover, the implementation of coalitions was limited in number, and tended to be
geographically concentrated in a few Colombian departments (Puyana 2012). For example,
at least one coalition was formed in half of the elections in the department of Risaralda (7
out of 14), whereas coalitions were formed in less than 5% of elections in the department of
Bolı´var. Hence, the new rules did not create major differences in the number of candidates
12 This difference between average levels of number of candidates is statistically significant in a paired
t-test analysis.
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or even in the implementation of coalitions between rounds. Nonetheless, we can still
compare the relationship between parties and turnout to assess if coalitions had any effect.
In the following analysis, I estimate the impact of the number of candidates on the
levels and change in turnout, as well as the impact of the change in number of candidates
on the varying levels of voter turnout across time. The analysis is composed of six re-
gression models, evenly divided for modeling turnout rates in 2007 and 2011. In the first
model for each year, the dependent and independent variables are static, which means I
am assuming no influence of previous scores on the relationship. The second model, the
dependent variable is the change in levels of turnout but the number of candidates is still
static for the specific year (t). In the third model, I estimate the impact of the change in
number of mayoral candidates on the difference in levels of turnout across years for the
same municipalities, while controlling for the initial number of candidates in the previous
election (t-1). Hence, the second regression per year is a simple autoregressive model with
lagged value for the dependent variable but static predictors, while the third model is an
autoregressive distributed lag model (ADL).13 Moreover, I include the margin of victory
from the previous election, sets of dummies for the size of the municipality and for each
department as controls. In the models for the 2011 round of elections, I also include vari-
ables for the number of coalitions in the election and a binary for if the winning candidate
was part of a coalition.
Models 1 and 4 indicate the number of candidates in an election is negatively asso-
13 In order for these models to generate unbiased and consistent estimators, standard OLS assumptions
about the distribution and covariation of the regression residuals ut must be met. Namely, the residuals
must be stochastic with mean zero (E(ut )=0), variance equal to Σ2, and uncorrelated with the predictors
(cov(xt ,ut )=0) (Gujarati and Porter 2009). I test for these assumptions and find that while there is a small
level of heterokedasticity, the results are unchanged when using alternatives to correct the standard errors.
Furthermore, the disturbance (i.e. residuals) is not correlated with the number of candidates variables.
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Table 3.1: Levels of Turnout across Municipalities, Colombia 2007-2011
2007 2011
Turnoutt ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout Turnoutt ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout
Turnoutt−1 −0.469∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Number of Candidatest −0.670∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗
(0.136) (0.100) (0.155) (0.080)
∆ Number of Candidates −0.412∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗
(0.103) (0.083)
Number of Candidatest−1 −0.463∗∗ −0.261∗∗
(0.141) (0.098)
Margin of Victoryt−1 −0.029∗ 0.013 0.013 −0.049∗∗ 0.010 0.010
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of Coalitionst −1.112 −0.721 −0.722
(1.030) (0.532) (0.534)
Winner Coalitiont 1.283 0.980 0.983
(1.656) (0.855) (0.859)
Size of Electorate- Very Small 3.502∗∗∗ 2.134∗∗ 1.933∗ 3.872∗∗∗ 1.829∗∗∗ 1.825∗∗∗
(1.023) (0.752) (0.790) (1.030) (0.536) (0.547)
Size of Electorate- Small 1.079 0.241 0.092 1.209 0.278 0.276
(0.976) (0.717) (0.746) (0.979) (0.506) (0.510)
Size of Electorate- Large −4.512∗ −0.991 −0.962 −4.543∗ −1.921 −1.919
(2.127) (1.557) (1.585) (2.141) (1.108) (1.109)
Size of Electorate- Very Large −6.155∗∗ −2.444 −2.404 −7.271∗∗∗ −3.881∗∗∗ −3.877∗∗∗
(2.009) (1.472) (1.546) (2.007) (1.043) (1.049)
Dummies for department Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 72.759∗∗∗ 33.916∗∗∗ 34.086∗∗∗ 70.228∗∗∗ 27.081∗∗∗ 27.102∗∗∗
(6.988) (5.281) (5.350) (7.047) (3.840) (3.886)
Adj. R2 0.493 0.522 0.519 0.486 0.324 0.323
Num. obs. 900 899 884 908 906 906
Source: Electoral National Institute of Colombia
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
ciated with the level of turnout in mayoral elections in Colombia. Similarly, the coefficients
for the dummy variables indicate a negative relationship between size of municipality and
levels of turnout. Models 2 and 5 indicate the number of candidates is also associated with
a reduction in level of turnout across years, though the magnitude of the relationship is
smaller. Finally, the coefficient for ∆ Number of Candidates in models 3 and 6 show that
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a positive change in number of candidates across time is significantly associated with a
negative change in turnout across elections.14 Yet, the coefficient for the lagged measure,
which measures the combined effect of number of candidates at time t-1 and the change in
the number of candidates, indicates the drop in turnout is largely driven by the change at
time t, not the initial level. In other words, because the difference in coefficient is small
between the change and static variables, the results indicate the change at the last moment
(t) drives the drop in rates of turnout across years.
These results are consistent before and after the implementation of coalitions in sub-
national elections in Colombia, which suggests that, at least in this case, the sheer number
of options has an independent negative effect on individual engagement with elections.15
The presence of coalitions seemed to moderately affect turnout, but the coefficients do not
reach statistical significance. To a certain extent, this result is not surprising given mayors
do not need to create coalitions after an election to have a mandate, and the fact the 2011
rounds of elections was the first time coalitions were formed in subnational elections in
Colombia.
14 A possible alternative explanation for the negative association between number of candidates and lower
turnout is that elections with less candidates may be perceived as more competitive, which could increase
cognitive engagement with politics (e.g. Kam and Utych 2011, Duffy and Tavits 2008, Levine and Palfrey
2007). In separate analysis, I estimate these relationships controlling for the size of the margin of victory of
the election, and the direction and significance of coefficients is unchanged.
15 In appendix C, I also estimate this relationship by separating the number of candidates in elections with
sets of dummies. The results indicate that the increase in options from one to two is important for increasing
participation among citizens, but the continued increase in the number of electoral choices can be negative,
especially when the number reaches five or more.
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3.2.2 Mayoral Elections in Brazil
Mayoral elections in Brazil are similar to Colombia’s in the extent that they
are partisan, there is wide variation in the number of candidates across municipalities, and
coalitions are formed prior to voting day, which means citizens should be able to take into
account the role of coalitions into their voting calculus. However, local races in Brazil
contrast with Colombia in a few ways. Gubernatorial and municipal elections are not con-
current, incumbent mayors are allowed to run for a second term, voting is compulsory and,
more importantly, coalitions at the local level have existed for over three decades and are
much more frequent, which allows for a better test of the role of coalitions in shaping voter
turnout.16 The analysis of turnout levels across municipalities in Brazil also adds to the
study of efficacy presented in the chapter 2, in which respondents who live in municipali-
ties where there were more mayoral candidates presented lower levels of internal efficacy
for local issues. Hence, the expectation here is that a higher number of candidates should
lower levels of turnout, even when taking into account the number and size of coalitions
being formed.17
Given voting in Brazil is compulsory and enforced, it is not surprising the average
voter turnout rate in municipal elections in Brazil is much higher than in Colombia, though
the variation across municipalities is much smaller.18 Moreover, due to reelection and a
larger proportion of small-sized municipalities, the distribution in the number of candi-
dates is also less dispersed than in Colombia. The average number of mayoral candidates
16 Municipal elections comprise the election of mayors and local councilmen.
17 I discuss how one-candidate elections are different below in footnote 21.
18 The distribution of turnout rates across municipalities in Brazil, as well as a map of Brazil with the
number of candidates per municipality is presented in appendix C.
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in the Brazilian mayoral candidates in 2008 and 2012 were approximately 2.9 and 2.6,
respectively.19
Figure 3.3: Number of Mayoral Candidates across Municipalities, Brazil 2012
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Analogously to the analysis of mayoral elections in Colombia, I test for the impact
of the number of electoral options on turnout rates first with a standard regression without
any lagged variables. In a second model, I analyze the change in turnout rates between
2008 and 2012, but do not account for the number of candidates in the previous election.
Finally, the third model estimates the impact of the change in the number of candidates
on the variation of turnout rates across years. I also include campaign-level measures that
characterize the structure of electoral competition such as the presence of the incumbent,
presence of candidates from the two most institutionalized parties, and coalitions of non-
ideologically aligned parties.20
19 The similarity in the distribution across years indicates that nothing weird happened in the interim
between elections that would disrupt parties from having more or less candidates at the local level.
20 The operationalization of institutionalization and ideological parties are the same from the previous
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To model the impact of coalitions on turnout, I include the the average size of coali-
tions (i.e. the total number of parties divided by the number of candidates), and the size
of the winning candidate’s coalition. To account for some potential differences in the set
of candidates, I use a “kitchen-sink” approach and include measures of the total number
of candidates who are male, married, and finished post-secondary education.21 Finally, I
include sets of dummies for the size of the polity and states. The Table 3.2 presents the
results of the OLS regressions.22
Similar to the results from the analysis of elections in Colombia, Model 1 indi-
cates a higher number of candidates in mayoral elections is associated with lower levels of
turnout.23 The second model indicates that a higher number of candidates is also associated
with a negative change in turnout.24 And in the third model, the coefficient for ∆ Number
of Candidates indicates an increase in number of candidates across time is associated with
a drop in levels of turnout across elections, though this result is only significant at an alpha
chapter based on the idea that the accumulation of presidencies and disputes between the PT and PSDB in
presidential and majoritarian elections has generally organized the structure of political competition in the
country (Mainwaring, Power and Neto 2018).
21 The inclusion of the candidates’ characteristics is driven by the fact the Brazilian electoral tribunal col-
lects more information about the candidates than its Colombia counterpart. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable
to think that candidates’ characteristics may shape the types of issues that become salient in local campaigns,
as well as how individuals feel about the candidates themselves.
22 In appendix C, I present the results of the same models including the log of the sum of largest cam-
paign expense by the candidates as a measure of campaign spending in the models. The number of cases is
smaller because of missing data and because the Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribune does not provide this
information for candidates in one-candidate elections. Aside from the fact the coefficient for the ∆ Number
of Candidates in the third model reaches conventional levels statistical significance, the results are largely un-
changed. Moreover, simpler versions of these models without the characteristics of candidates yield similar
results when the sample is restrained to elections with at least more than one candidate.
23 Cunow (2014) finds a similar result when analyzing similar data from Brazil, though his results do not
take into consideration the number of coalitions.
24 For robustness checks, I also run these models only in elections with less than 200,000 voters (where
there is not a second round with the two most-voted candidates), and the results are consistent. Similar to the
analysis in the previous chapter, when the models include the effective number of candidates (ENC) instead
of the total, a relationship in neither direction is found. Additionally, I test this relationship when controlling
for the level of competition in the election measured by the share of votes by the winning candidate. The
results again show that non-competitive elections, like one-candidate races, turnout drops significantly.
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Table 3.2: Levels of Turnout across Municipalities, Brazil 2012
Turnoutt ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout
Turnoutt−1 −0.197∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Number of Candidatest −0.899∗∗∗ −0.161∗
(0.138) (0.073)
∆ Number of Candidates −0.136
(0.073)
Number of Candidatest−1 −0.205∗∗
(0.075)
Incumbentt 0.099 0.007 0.021
(0.124) (0.065) (0.065)
Institutionalized Partiest −0.132 −0.079 −0.079
(0.098) (0.051) (0.051)
Average Size of Coalitionst −0.519∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗ −0.067∗∗
(0.045) (0.024) (0.024)
Size of Coalition of Winning Candidatet −0.012 −0.000 0.000
(0.025) (0.013) (0.013)
Non-ideological Coalitionst 0.343∗ 0.093 0.092
(0.135) (0.071) (0.071)
Number of Male Candidatest −0.147 0.063 0.062
(0.108) (0.057) (0.057)
Number of Married Candidatest 0.210∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.082) (0.043) (0.043)
Number of Candidates with Post-Secondary Educationt −0.279∗∗∗ −0.074∗ −0.074∗
(0.071) (0.037) (0.037)
Size of Electorate- Small −1.557∗∗∗ 0.085 0.105
(0.228) (0.120) (0.121)
Size of Electorate- Medium −1.021∗∗∗ 0.169 0.202
(0.309) (0.162) (0.163)
Size of Electorate- Large 0.098 0.392 0.488
(0.512) (0.268) (0.271)
Size of Electorate- Very Large 1.847∗∗ 0.843∗ 0.990∗∗
(0.644) (0.337) (0.343)
Dummies for states Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 88.907∗∗∗ 15.873∗∗∗ 16.086∗∗∗
(0.993) (0.798) (0.802)
Num. obs. 5562 5562 5562
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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level of 0.065.25 The coefficient for the lagged measure in the third model indicates that
the change in turnout is also driven by the number of candidates in the previous round of
elections.26
The results regarding the impact of coalitions on turnout is mixed. While the models
indicate that turnout rates are lower in municipalities where the average size of coalitions
is larger, the size of the coalition of the winning candidate does not seem to related to the
level of turnout. More precisely, a higher level of one party in candidates’ coalitions (at
time t) is associated with a smaller level of turnout by 0.52%, and an average drop in the
level of turnout across years of 0.07%.
Therefore, the analysis of mayoral elections in Brazil also provides evidence that a
larger number of electoral options is associated with lower levels of turnout independently
from the effect of coalitions. Nevertheless, even in the unlikely case of mayoral elections
in Brazil where voting is compulsory and parties and elections are not as programmatic as
parliamentary systems in Europe, the estimated relationship between size of coalition and
turnout indicates potential voters are less to turn out on when candidates belong to a larger
coalition of parties.
25 It should be noted this analysis assumes the impact of an increase of one candidate is equal across
the distribution of number of candidates. In reality, however, we should expect any increase in number of
candidates to have a positive effect on turnout for uncontested elections of only one candidate. On the other
hand, the impact on turnout associated with an increase in the number of candidates might be different as the
number of candidates continues to grow. For this reason, I also run the models with the number of candidates
separated into sets of dummies in appendix C. The results show the difference in cross-sectional levels of
turnout as well as change in turnout across time is largest between elections with two and three candidates.
26 To see the statistical significance of this result, I reparameterize the regression equation without the
“delta” variables as yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2xt + β3xt−1 + βzZ + ut , which yields β2, the coefficient for the
impact of number of candidates at time t, equal to the coefficient for ∆ Number of Candidates presented here.
However, the coefficient for the number of candidates at time t-1 does not include the impact of number of
candidates at time t.
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3.2.3 Turnout rates in New Zealand over time
An important limitation of the previous analyses is that mayoral elections in Colom-
bia and Brazil differ in important ways from traditional case studies of coalitions for a few
reasons. First, these are majoritarian elections for a position at a local level rather than
proportional elections to a country’s national parliament. Second, these countries’ party
systems are known for being largely fragmented with few institutionalized and program-
matic parties, which means the formation of coalitions should carry less weight than in
more ideology-based systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).
In turn, the political system in New Zealand resembles the characteristics of Eu-
ropean countries given parties in the country are more programmatic and have deep roots
in society than their counterparts in the most Latin American countries. And as described
in the previous chapter, the recent change in electoral rules makes New Zealand a unique
case for the study of the impact of more parties and coalition government on voter behav-
ior. Before 1996, either the Labour or National party always held an absolute majority of
Parliament, but since the implementation of the new electoral formula, neither of the major
parties has been able to win more than half of seats, consequently forcing the formation of
coalitions with minor parties in order to form a majority.
The enactment of the mixed-member proportional system was designed to instill
greater satisfaction with democracy and reduce the level disproportionality in the trans-
lation of votes into seats in the New Zealand’s general elections (Royal Commission on
the Electoral System 1986). The reform was designed to reduce electoral disproportion-
ality, which should lead individuals whose views were not congruent with any of the two
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major parties to feel they motivated to vote for minor parties as their ballots would now
be “counted” in the allocation of seats rather than “wasted” on losing parties under the
old first-past-the-post system. Hence, classic works on electoral systems would predict an
increase in voter turnout due to less disproportionality, and possibly even due to gains in
efficacy connected with a more diverse set of options and increased mobilization from par-
ties (Duverger 1954, Cox 1997).27 However, after a small bump in participation in 1996,
voter turnout in New Zealand has actually declined since the more proportional system was
implemented, reaching a low of roughly 75% in 2011, which is equal to a drop of more
than 10 percentage points when compared to the early 1990’s (Vowles 2010).28 In New
Zealand’s last national election in 2017, turnout rates were 5 percentage points lower than
before the implementation of the new reform. So what explains this overall decrease in
voter participation in spite of the electoral formula becoming more proportional?
The electoral reform brought a series of changes to New Zealand politics including
an expansion in the size of parliament, more seats allocated for Maori candidates, and the
introduction of the dual vote system (i.e. the electorate vote- district voting in the form of a
plurality system, and the party vote- national voting in the form of a proportional election),
but I would argue the increase in the number of parties in the New Zealand Parliament and
resultant formation of coalitions are, at least partially, responsible for the decrease in voter
27 Recent works, nonetheless, show that changes in electoral formula do not always have an immediate
impact on rates of turnout in Norway, Poland, and New Zealand (Cox, Fiva and Smith 2015, Gendz´will,
Zo´ltak and Rutkowski 2015, Vowles 2010). According to Cox, Fiva and Smith (2015), the increase in turnout
associated with the change to a proportional formula depends on the initial level of competition of the district.
In Poland, while a change from proportional representation to first-past-the-post did not affect turnout, it
had other expected outcomes such as the reduction in the number of parties elected and election of women
(Gendz´will, Zo´ltak and Rutkowski 2015).
28 The drop in turnout associated with the change from FPTP and MMP is similar between the Maori and
non-Maori population (Parliamentary Library Research Paper 2015).
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turnout. Figure 4 presents the change in turnout and effective number of legislative parties
in the eight elections before and after the implementation of the new electoral system.
Figure 3.4: Levels of Turnout and ENLP over time, New Zealand 1975-2017
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The dashed grey line shows the increase in the effective number of parties in the
parliament after first election under the new system, while the solid black line portrays the
inverse pattern of lowering levels of turnout after 1996.29 The implementation of the new
electoral rule, thus, increased the participation of minor parties transforming the structure
of political competition from a standard two-party system into a system of multiple parties
and coalition-based government.
According to the theory proposed here, this change in party system should increase
29 The increase in ENLP is a function of both an increase in the total number of parties in the New Zealand
parliament (roughly 3 to 7) and an increase in the share of seats by the minor parties.
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the difficulty of absorbing and processing political information for citizens (i.e. discerning
and attributing responsibility to the parties), which would negatively affect individuals’
internal efficacy and their engagement with politics. And in fact, under the new electoral
system, turnout rates decreased while the average number of candidates per district and the
number of parliamentary parties increased.
Simultaneously, every government since the enactment of the new system has been
formed by a coalition of parties. And according to the argument by Jackman (1987), po-
tential electors should feel less motivated as they learn that what is implemented by gov-
ernment is different from what individual parties campaign on given parties often need to
alter their agenda in search of a compromise when building a coalition after the election,
particularly supporters of the two major parties used to one-party governments. Karp and
Bowler (2001) provide evidence in favor of this mechanism by showing that partisanship
and preference for one-party government is associated with satisfaction with democracy
among individuals in New Zealand after the implementation of the new system.30 Vowles
(2010), on the other hand, finds that the drawing of new district boundaries was key in the
decrease of levels of turnout due to diminishing competition in some districts .
Thus, the drop in turnout after the implementation of the new electoral system con-
tradicts arguments that levels of efficacy should be higher among individuals associated
with multiparty systems. And while this analysis cannot fully assess the extent to which
specific mechanisms are responsible for the decrease of participation, it provides support
for arguments that suggest more parties may lead to lower levels of turnout, and corrobo-
30 Furthermore, Miller (1998) finds that New Zealanders perceived the new coalition government as less
predictable and transparent.
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rates the finding that the public’s average level of internal efficacy dropped in New Zealand
after the 1996 election.
It is important to note, however, that voter turnout has also declined over the last
decades in many developed countries (Gray and Caul 2000, Blais et al. 2004). In an attempt
to evaluate the possibility that the drop in turnout is explained by factors unrelated to the
electoral system change like the generational change and increasing use in technology,
I compare the variation in levels of voter turnout between New Zealand and three other
British Commonwealth developed countries- Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom-
over the past four decades.
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Figure 3.5: Levels of Turnout and ENLP over time, New Zealand 1977-2017
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Figure 5 shows that in Australia rates of turnout have not changed substantially
over the past four decades, but this result may be a function of the fact the Australian
government offers incentives for citizens to vote. On the other hand, Canada and the United
Kingdom share similar patterns of lowering levels of turnout with New Zealand across the
last two and a half decades. Hence, it is possible that the decline in turnout is actually
attributed to extraneous factors from the change in party system. In fact, Vowles (2010)
provides evidence that younger generations were less likely to turnout, but the reason why
is still not clear. Even so, considering the electoral reform decreased the disproportionality
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in elections, which should have increased voter turnout according to classic works, it is
remarkable that general pattern is negative, suggesting that, at least in part, the negative
trend is a product of the increase in parties and novelty of coalition government.
3.3 Discussion
In this chapter, I examine the validity of the positive correlation between mul-
tiparty systems and voter turnout as evidence for the idea that more political parties in a
system promote higher levels of efficacy among citizens. I argue this correlation is spuri-
ous, driven by the fact that the degree of proportionality of an election negatively affects
both number of parties and turnout. Existing observational and experimental studies indi-
cate that, after isolating confounding factors, the effect of more electoral options on voter
behavior is actually negative (Blais and Carty 1990, Jackman 1987, Lau and Redlawsk
2001, Cunow 2014). But the exact mechanism for why this is the case we are less cer-
tain about (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais 2006, Cox, Fiva and Smith 2015). Hence,
I try to assess the role of the number of candidates and effect of coalitions as alternative
explanations for the negative effect more candidates seems to have on turnout.
Using data from local level electoral data in Colombia, I compare the relationship
between number of candidates and turnout across rounds of mayoral elections with and
without the presence of coalitions. The results indicate a clear negative effect on turnout
associated with an increase in the number of candidates, whereas coalitions did not seem to
have had any effect on turnout. I conduct a similar analysis of mayoral elections in Brazil,
which again shows a negative effect of increasing the number of candidates even when
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controlling for characteristics of the municipality, candidates and campaign. However, the
results also indicate that turnout is lower in elections when candidates are part of larger
coalitions, which provides support for the idea that citizens recognize and dislike when
candidates are part of larger coalitions.
Finally, I look at how the transformation of party system in New Zealand affected
levels of voter turnout. In contrast to the expectation that turnout would rise due to more
proportional elections and higher congruency between voters and parties, levels of electoral
participation decreased over the last two decades. While it is not clear whether this result
is driven by exogenous factors like generation and sociodemographic changes, I argue this
drop in turnout is, at least partially, explained by the increase in the number of parties and
need for the major parties to government coalitions.
In sum, the analyses presented here challenge arguments that suggest an increase in
electoral options would promote voter turnout due to higher individual efficacy. Instead, it
provides evidence that corroborate the results presented in the previous chapter that individ-
uals have a difficulty time managing complex informational environments and become less
likely to engage with politics when the number of parties increase. The results also point
toward a negative effect of coalitions on turnout in Brazil and New Zealand supporting
claims that the public’s preference for one-party government may be one of the reasons for
the negative relationship between multiparty systems and voter turnout, after controlling
for the degree of proportionality.
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Chapter 4
A Closer Look at the Effect of Number of Parties on Political Knowledge
4.1 Democratic Politics and Political Knowledge
From Aristotle to Dahl, theorists of democracy have argued that a certain level of
political knowledge by the citizenry is fundamental for the stability and effectiveness of a
democratic regime. According to variations of this perspective, the populace needs not only
to be appreciative of and willing to fight for democratic institutions, but also able to make
informed decisions and hold representatives accountable. In the words of Delli Carpini
and Keeter (1996, 5): “Knowledge is a keystone to other civic requisites. In the absence of
adequate information neither passion nor reason is likely to lead to decisions that reflect the
real interests of the public. And democratic principles must be understood to be accepted
and acted on in any meaningful way.”
In reality, however, decades of survey research have shed light on the dearth of
factual knowledge and lack of structured political opinions by the masses in democracies
across the world, especially in the United States (e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee
1954, Converse 1964, Luskin 1987). Scholars have provided different answers to this
paradox. According to some, elections inhibit the impact of uninformed voters by hav-
ing parties manage the political agenda and select candidates who are substantially more
qualified than the average citizen (Aldrich 1995, Schattschneider 1942). Others claim that
poor measurement may have led researchers to underestimate the extent to which the pub-
lic is knowledgeable (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, Mondak 1999, Mondak and Davis 2001,
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Prior and Lupia 2008). Another group of scholars argues the lack of knowledge among the
public is a product of the information environment structured around political competition
and the works of the media given they are responsible for the amount and type of politi-
cal information citizens attain (Neuman, Just and Crippler 1992, Jerit, Barabas and Bolsen
2006, Iyengar et al. 2010).
This idea that contextual factors shape the extent to which the citizenry is politi-
cally informed has inspired some comparative scholars to argue that the number of parties
in a political system is positively associated with a society’s level of information, which
would explain the low levels of knowledge by the American populace given the country’s
two-party system. According to Gordon and Segura (1997), arguably the most influential
piece in the study of political knowledge across countries, political systems with multiple
parties provide more opportunities for the mass public to be informed given that parties
have the incentive to differentiate themselves and provide more and better information to
the electorate.1 Similar to the efficacy and mobilization arguments discussed in the previ-
ous chapters, this Downsian (1957) logic assumes that citizens are well-equipped to absorb
and process an increasing amount of political information. Nonetheless, Gordon and Se-
gura (1997) also recognize that the proliferation of parties may demand more cognitive
engagement from citizens given more parties can lead to murkier differences between par-
ties, which means that at some point the gain associated with the increase in number of
parties should diminish, and possibly become negative.
Two subsequent articles follow this foundational piece and find similar results in
1 Gordon and Segura (1997) broke new ground in the comparative study of political knowledge, and has
had since then a lasting impact on the current literature. According to GoogleScholar, the article has been
cited over 245 times as of June 25, 2017.
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which the effect of parties on individual knowledge is positive at first, but negative after a
threshold of 2.5 effective number of parties (Berggren 2001, Fraile 2013). Yet, other works
that make use of distinct measures of knowledge show null or negative findings concerning
the effect of the number of electoral choices on individual knowledge. Table 1 provides a
summary of this literature by listing the authors, data, measurement of political knowledge,
and estimated effect of the number of options on the menu of voters.
Table 4.1: Studies of Political Knowledge Across Countries
Study Data Measure
Effect of
Number of Parties
Gordon and Segura (1997) Eurobarometer 1989
Party Placement
Distance Positive then negative
Berggren (2001) Eurobarometer 1989
Party Placement
Distance Positive then negative
Lau and Redlawsk (2001) Experimental data Vote choice
More candidates,
less correct vote choice
Renno´ (2004)
Brazil 2002
Panel Survey
Recollection of
candidates’ names Negative
Gro¨nlund and Milner (2006) CSES R1 3 Factual Questions PR not higher than FPTP
Toka (2008) CSES R1-2 Correct voting Null
Fraile (2013) EES 2009
Index of 7 True/False
Questions Bell-shaped
Cunow (2014) Experimental data Vote choice
More candidates,
less correct vote choice
Clark (2016) CSES R3
Party Placement
Distance Null
Busch (2016) CSES R1-2
Party Placement
Distance
Multiparty higher
but ENLP negative
Fortin-Rittberger (2016) CSES R2-3 Factual Questions Null
Fortunato, Stevenson
and Vonnahme (2016) CSES and ESS
Party Placement
Order Null
Turgeon and Lloyd (2017) CSES
Party Placement
Order Null
In sum, the existing literature presents mixed findings regarding this relationship.
While the three studies mentioned above indicate the relationship is positive at first, but
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negative later, Gro¨nlund and Milner (2006) find levels of political knowledge are not higher
in countries with proportional representation systems (associated with multiparty systems)
when compared to majoritarian systems (associated with two-party systems). Busch (2016)
also uses the placement of parties in a left-right scale but finds that while individuals in
systems with more than 2.5 effective parties seem to have higher levels of knowledge, the
effect of an increase in the number of parties is negative, controlling for multiple factors.2
Moreover, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) and Cunow (2014) find that giving respondents more
candidates in hypothetical elections reduces the probability they will pick the candidate
that best aligns with their preferences. Renno´ (2004) finds that individuals are less likely
to remember the name of candidates in scenarios with more candidates. A third group of
recent studies, however, does not find the number of parties to be a statistically significant
predictor of levels of knowledge across countries when controlling for a diverse set of fac-
tors (Toka 2008, Clark 2016, Fortin-Rittberger 2016, Fortunato, Stevenson and Vonnahme
2016, Turgeon and Lloyd 2017).3
The initial positive effect found by Gordon and Segura (1997), Berggren (2001),
and Fraile 2013 also stands in contrast to the theory posited here that, because settings with
multiple parties increase the difficulty of managing political information and consequently
reduce individuals’ self-efficacy, we should not expect political engagement and levels of
sophistication to be higher in multiparty contexts. Instead, the cognitive engagement with
politics and desire to acquire more information should be lower in environments in which
citizens do not believe they are capable of understanding the action of parties and being
2 In a second model, the author finds the result to be null.
3 It should be noted that not all studies of the last group set as their primary objective the assessment
of the relationship between effective number of parties (ENP) and knowledge, but instead use ENP as an
statistical control.
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effective political agents. In fact, informed political participation is both a product and
cause of higher levels of perceived efficacy. That is, one’s belief in his/her capability to
understand and participate in politics should drive one’s motivation to seek and process
more information, and increased levels of political knowledge should enhance one’s belief
about their potential to understand and influence political processes. As a result, we should
not expect a positive change in individuals’ levels of political knowledge associated with
increasing number of parties. If so, what explains the divergence between this finding and
the expectation proposed here?
In this chapter, I argue that the results presented by Gordon and Segura (1997) are
driven by inexact evaluation and interpretation of the results. More specifically, I present
evidence that the estimated positive effect of increasing the number of parties is driven
by a very small number of cases and due to an arbitrary decision for imputing values for
“Don’t know” responses.4 In addition, I use a collection of 85 national surveys in 46
countries collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project to test
the relationship between the effective number of political parties and average levels of
knowledge. The results indicate that a larger number of political parties in the political
system does not seem to affect average levels of information and agreement about parties’
left-right positions, though it is associated with a larger gap in knowledge between those
with lower and higher levels of education. Ultimately, the reinterpretation of Gordon and
Segura (1997) and the analysis of CSES data indicate that the original strategy for imputing
values is likely to lead to biased results.
4 Throughout the chapter, I use the term “Don’t Know” to indicate both refusals and actual “Don’t know”
responses.
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4.2 Measuring Political Knowledge Across Countries
While the necessity of a knowledgeable citizenry for the stability and quality of
a democracy is still up for debate, there is little dispute among scholars around the benefits
of a population of political sophisticates. Politically-informed individuals are more likely to
recognize the value of democracy, to participate in politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996,
Inglehart and Welzel 2010), to have consistent and coherent opinions (Zaller 1992), and to
better use heuristics in making decisions (Kuklinski et al. 2001). However, the continual
challenge faced by scholars is to adequately measure the construct of political sophistica-
tion, particularly across settings and groups (Mondak 2001, Mondak and Anderson 2004,
Pere´z 2015). Quantifying the level of political sophistication of individuals is increasingly
difficult in a comparative setting where the diversity of systems and contexts may affect the
validity and reliability of survey instruments due to variation in the importance of specific
pieces of political information and consistencies across issues (Clark 2016, Luskin 1990,
Milner 2002).
Gordon and Segura (1997) (henceforth called GS) seek to overcome this problem
by proposing an original method of measuring political knowledge across countries that re-
lies on the perception of ideological position of political parties in the left-right spectrum.
According to this approach, respondents are asked to place their country’s political parties
on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means most left and 10 means most right, and researchers
calculate how close a respondent’s answer is to the “correct” position of the party, which
can be based on independent data such as opinions of experts, or as in their main analysis,
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assumed to be the average placement of all respondents who provided an answer.5 For
example, if a respondent placed party A at 2 on the left-right scale but the sample average
response was 3.3, the respondent’s distance for party A would be 1.3. After this process is
done for all parties and respondents asked in a national survey, the respondents’ distances
to the average party placement are averaged out and taken as a measure of political sophis-
tication. That is, the lower the overall distance in party placement, the more knowledgeable
an individual is estimated to be. For ease of interpretation, the measure is inverted by sub-
tracting each score from the possible highest value (9), so higher figures indicate more
knowledge.6 In cases in which respondents choose to not place a party in the spectrum,
researchers imputed a value of the mean distance of all respondents who picked an answer
plus one standard deviation of the mean distance. The authors’ rationale behind this de-
cision is that adding the penalty to the mean distance increases variance while penalizing
those who are assumed to lack information on the parties. In other words, the measurement
assumes missing responses would have been far from accurate- namely, the response would
have misplaced the party by the average level of inaccuracy plus one standard deviation of
the average answer.7
As stated by the authors, because the measure relies on the application of abstract
5 Busch (2016), for example, uses independent data from the Comparative Manifesto Project to mark the
correct position of parties. GS report that they also conducted their analysis with expert placement of each
party as the benchmark, and while most results did not change, the estimated relationship between number of
effective parties and individual knowledge cease to yield statistically significant results (see page 141).
6 In mathematical form, the measure is calculated as follows:
PKi = 9− (
n
∑
j=1
|pi j− pˆ j|)/n j (4.1)
where i indicates an individual respondent, j indicates a particular party, pi j indicates the placement of party j
by respondent i, pˆ j indicates the average placement of party j by all respondents in the sample who provided a
value, n j indicates the number of parties asked in the survey, and PKi indicates the level of political knowledge
of respondent i.
7 An illustration of how this imputation approach works is presented in appendix D.
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terminology (left-right) and on parties rather than specific policy issues, it is designed to
be reliable over time and valid across countries. Yet, based on findings from works that
look at individuals’ willingness and ability to place themselves and parties on the left-right
spectrum, I would argue this measure still makes strong assumptions about the meaning of
the scale, the salience of parties across time and space, and possibly even the way the scale
is interpreted by respondents. For instance, the approach assumes that the ideological left-
right spectrum is equally meaningful across countries, which we know can be problematic
particularly in places where social cleavages did not shape the formation of party and party
systems, such as those in Latin America (Dix 1989, Zechmeister 2006). But for the pur-
pose of demonstrating the implication of more basic decisions behind the estimation of the
relationship between number of parties and average levels of political knowledge across
countries, I will focus here on the interpretation of their regression model’s coefficient and
the assumption behind the imputation of missing values.
4.3 Small N, Big Conclusion
GS and Berggren (2001) argue that more parties should have a positive impact
on knowledge due to better opportunities for information attainment associated with multi-
party systems in which parties have the incentive to carve out distinct and clear programs.
This positive relationship, however, is hypothesized to be diluted as the number of parties
“climbs significantly higher” because parties are less likely to differ and coalitions are more
likely to be built, which consequently increases the informational demands from citizens.
To test the validity of the argument, the authors use data from twelve European countries
72
surveyed by the 1989 Eurobarometer, as well as party-system data at the national level.
The hypothesized curvilinear effect is operationalized by dividing countries into
two groups of more or less than 2.5 effective number of parties, and then interacting the
dummy variable that sorts the groups with the original effective number of parties vari-
able. Thus, instead of using a quadratic term or other traditional techniques of non-linear
transformation that would evaluate the marginal effect of the variable for different values
(Kam and Franzese 2007), this model estimates the average change in political knowledge
associated with an increase of one unit in the effective number of parties for the two groups
separately. The authors justify this decision by claiming that this model adequately ac-
counts for the difference in incentives between two-party and multiparty system proposed
by Downs (1957). Although this reasoning alone is questionable given neither their ar-
gument nor the operationalization of party system fragmentation is laid out in such way,
the principal problem with this analysis is that the breakup of the already small number of
cases leads the authors to make strong assertions about the primary effect of the number
of effective parties based on a sample of three countries. That is, the categorization based
on the cut-off of 2.5 effective number of parties divides the sample into one group of three
countries with fewer than 2.5 effective number of parties and another of nine countries
with more parties.8 Table 4.2 presents the classification of countries based on their effec-
tive number of legislative parties (ENLP), and the average levels of political knowledge per
country estimated both in the authors’ original analysis and replicated here.
The non-multiparty group is composed of Portugal, Great Britain and Greece. And
8 Given the lack of strong theoretical reasoning for grouping this parties, this division ends up amplifying
the long discussed problem of small number of observations in comparative cross-national research (Lijphart
1971, Lieberson 1991, King, Keohane and Verba 1994, Mahoney 2003).
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Table 4.2: Number of Parties and Levels of Knowledge Across Countries
Country ENLP Multi-Party Dummy GS (1997) Country Mean Replication Country Mean
Portugal 1.5 0 7.31 7.31
Great Britain 2.2 0 7.08 7.08
Greece 2.4 0 8.15 8.16
Spain 2.9 1 6.73 6.73
France 3.0 1 7.69 7.69
Ireland 3.0 1 7.16 7.16
Germany 3.7 1 7.57 7.58
Netherlands 3.7 1 7.32 7.32
Luxembourg 3.8 1 7.03 7.03
Italy 4.1 1 7.22 7.29
Denmark 5.0 1 7.69 7.69
Belgium 7.1 1 6.63 6.63
while the number of parties between them vary slightly, the large difference between them
is in the average level of political knowledge. Greeks present a substantial advantage over
their counterparts, both in the original and replicated measurements.9 Because of the small
number of countries, this lead by Greece is largely responsible for the conclusion that
more parties produces more knowledge among the citizenry in countries with fewer than
2.5 effective number of parties. Figure 4.1 plots the bivariate relationships between the
effective number of parties and the average levels of political knowledge for the two groups.
The unfilled points and dashed line indicate the position and relationship for countries
below the 2.5 cut-off, and the filled points and dotted line for the group above the threshold.
The elevated score of Greece (GR) in the average level of knowledge carries an ex-
traordinary weight in the estimation of the relationship for the first group due to the small
number of cases. Similarly, the outlier number of parties in Belgium (BEL) is key to the
relationship for the other group. Still, the decisive factor for the results seems to be the de-
9 The two measures align almost perfectly. The exceptions are Greece, Germany and Italy, for which the
results deviate minutely in the second digit.
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Figure 4.1: Bivariate Relationship between ENLP and Levels of Political Knowledge, Orig-
inal Specification
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cision to divide the countries at 2.5. To show how this cut-off is critical, Figure 4.2 presents
two variations of this analysis. The chart on the left shows the bivariate relationships if the
groups were evenly split with a threshold of 3.5 effective number of parties. The chart on
the right presents the relationship when the countries are not divided into categories.
The change in cut-off not only adds a few cases to the first group, which decreases
the weight of Greece, but actually makes the bivariate relationship for the group with fewer
parties slightly negative. The relationship for the second group stays negative, though it
becomes even more reliant on Belgium’s position. The chart on the right does not impose
a separate analysis across groups and also presents a negative relationship between number
of parties and knowledge, which contradicts the authors’ original argument.
While this analyses illustrate the limitation of using the statistical approach with a
small number of cases, the model proposed by GS is more sophisticated given it accounts
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Figure 4.2: Bivariate Relationship between ENLP and Levels of Political Knowledge, Al-
ternative Specifications
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for a number of possible confounders. Their models include the following controls: the
degree of electoral disproportionality, a measure of national competitiveness, a dummy
variable indicating compulsory voting, a measure of degree of unicameralism and the num-
ber of years since the last national election.10 Therefore, to adequately assess the extent to
which the categorization of countries affects the estimated relationship, I replicate the first
model in table 4 of GS (page 140) and re-evaluate the relationship by first dropping the
interactive term, then the multiparty system dummy, and finally, testing a quadratic term of
effective number of parties.
It should also be noted that GS and Berggren (2001) use ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression, which underestimates the statistical uncertainty of the coefficient param-
10 Models 2 and 3 on page 140 by GS also includes five individual-level variables (income, education,
occupational impingement, television usage and newspaper usage), but they do not impact the results of the
national-level predictors and lead to a substantial reduction in the number of observations due to missing.
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eters (i.e. the standard errors) when analyzing nested data like respondents clustered within
mutually exclusive countries (Raudenbush and Bryk 1992, Snijders and Bosker 1999).11 To
correct this issue, I run hierarchical linear models (HLM) that account for the nesting in
estimating the standard errors. Hence, while the direction and magnitude of coefficients are
not affected, the standard errors are larger in the replication and subsequent models. Table
4.3 shows the results of these regression analyses.
The original model by GS suggests that the addition of one unit in the effective
number of parties is associated with an increase of over one point in the average level of
political knowledge for countries with fewer than 2.5 ENLP, but a small negative effect
for countries with more than the 2.5 ENLP threshold. 12 Moreover, according to the OLS
regression, all predictors reach statistical significance. The replication multi-level model
produces equivalent coefficients but more sober levels of uncertainty around the point es-
timates. The third model keeps the multiparty dummy but drops the interaction term (the
hypothesis of a heterogenous effect), which leads to a negative but much smaller effect of
number of parties. Finally, the attempt to model the relationship non-linearly points to a
positive but far from statistically significant change in the average level of knowledge for a
case with 0 ENLP (non-squared coefficient), and decreasing marginal effects for hypothet-
ical cases with larger values.13 For instance, the marginal effect for a case with 2 ENLP
11 In other words, the cross-national nature of the data means that observations (individuals’ responses
to the survey) are clustered within groups (countries). This means the estimation of statistical significance
should account for the clustering of observations by country, otherwise the model assumes that observations
are independent from one another. Formally, this means the model violates the Gauss-Markov Theorem in
which unobserved factors (ui) have a mean of 0 (E(ui)=0), equal variance (var(ui) = σ2), and more impor-
tantly, that there is no covariation between the unobserved factors (cov(ui,u j) = 0).
12 βENLP +βENLPxMultiparty = 1.092 - 1.257 = -0.165. This coefficient is statistically significant with the
biased OLS model, but not when estimated with the HLM model.
13 I decided not to center the ENLP variable in a way that would yield a meaningful coefficient for the
non-squared term to maintain consistency across models in the table.
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Table 4.3: Models of Cross-National Levels of Political Knowledge
GS Original
Model Replication No Interaction
No Multiparty
Dummy Squared Term
ENLP 1.122∗∗∗ 1.092∗ −0.166 −0.218∗ 0.134
(0.042) (0.489) (0.150) (0.111) (0.507)
Multiparty Dummy 2.213∗∗∗ 2.057∗ −0.346
(0.089) (0.995) (0.612)
ENLP x Multiparty −1.275∗∗∗ −1.257∗∗
(0.041) (0.479)
ENLP2 −0.039
(0.055)
Nat. Competitiveness 0.378∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.281 0.223 0.195
(0.012) (0.146) (0.221) (0.182) (0.196)
Disproportionality −0.059∗∗∗ −0.058 −0.053 −0.053 −0.042
(0.003) (0.039) (0.061) (0.057) (0.061)
Compulsory 0.042∗∗∗ 0.108 0.275 0.404 0.483
(0.024) (0.284) (0.435) (0.344) (0.379)
Degree of Unicameralism 0.073∗∗∗ 0.056 0.040 0.094 0.124
(0.008) (0.098) (0.153) (0.111) (0.124)
Years Since Election −0.079∗∗∗ −0.068 −0.095 −0.047 −0.015
(0.008) (0.097) (0.151) (0.116) (0.130)
Intercept 4.647∗∗∗ 4.722∗∗∗ 7.499∗∗∗ 7.353∗∗∗ 6.573∗∗∗
(0.106) (1.241) (1.021) (0.918) (1.460)
Num. obs. 11528 11528 11528 11528 11528
R2 0.230
Num. countries 12 12 12 12
Var. (countries) 0.073 0.182 0.157 0.174
Residual 0.527 0.527 0.527 0.527
Source: Eurobarometer 1989 and national-levels factors according to Gordon and Segura (1997)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
would be roughly zero, and for a case with 4 ENLP would be approximately -0.18.14
The fluctuation in results produced by the different alternatives to modeling the data
demonstrates the original findings suffer from a lack of robustness. The direction and sig-
nificance of the parameter of interest is volatile depending on the model specification. This
14 The marginal effect of a value is equal to the non-squared coefficient plus two times the coefficient for
the squared term times the value of x. In mathematical terms, it is the derivative of the polynomial term:
∂y
∂x = β1+ 2 β2x. Thus, in the case listed above, the marginal effect for a value of ENLPi is 0.134 minus 2
times 0.039 ENLPi. For more details on interpreting interactions, see Kam and Franzese (2007).
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contradicts the authors’ conviction of the hypothesized relationship and generalizability
of their findings Gordon and Segura (1997, 5): “The political and constitutional arrange-
ments of a society clearly affect the willingness of the citizenry to accumulate accurate
and abstract political information. Our model effectively explained a substantial portion
of the available cross-national variance, and did so using a more parsimonious model of
systematic factors that... are generalizable to other environments.” This imprecise inter-
pretation of a complex relationship that relies on a small number of cases seems to have
led scholars to make grander inferences than the data would support. In fact, this may well
serve as an example of when scholars should be wary of certain categorizations and broad
inference-making based on a limited sample.
4.4 How Missing Data is Handled Matters
The second limitation of the analysis by GS and Berggren (2001) derives from
the decision to impute values for missing responses. Instances in which respondents did
not place the party in the left-right scale, a value of the mean distance of all respondents
plus one standard deviation of this mean distance for the specific party was imputed. This
method thus assumes that respondents who did not provide a response would have, on
average, inaccurately placed that party by one standard deviation of the average response
more than the average response.
This approach deviates from the ways scholars have most often handled missing
data, at least in the study of political knowledge. Traditionally, respondents who would
chose to say they did not know the answer to factual questions such as “Who’s the prime
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minister of the United Kingdom?” would have been grouped with those who provided
a wrong answer (Luskin 1987, Luskin 1990). In other words, the conventional approach
to handling missing data in factual knowledge questions assumes respondents would have
given a wrong answer, if they did. However, because factual questions are usually treated
dichotomously, respondents who opted for DK were never penalized more than those who
gave a wrong answer.15 In fact, GS’s decision to assign lower than the average wrong score
to those who opt for not giving an answer stands in contrast to more recent studies that
have not only questioned the assumption that “don’t know” responses would have been
wrong (Mondak 2001, Gro¨nlund and Milner 2006), but even argued that those who opt for
DK are in fact more knowledgeable than those who give a wrong answer (Mondak 1999,
Mondak and Anderson 2004, Miller and Orr 2008). While this new approach to thinking
about missing data has received its share of criticisms (Luskin and Bullock 2011, Sturgis,
Allum and Smith 2008), the literature suggests that the way DK responses are handled can
often matter in measuring levels of political knowledge, and that assigning an extra penalty
those who choose to not provide an answer might be problematic.
Given the interval nature of the placement distance measure, any imputation scheme
would have to determine the extent to which those who did not provide an answer were or
were not knowledgeable.16 Nonetheless, the specific decision to impute and penalize has
substantial implications to the results because the patterns of missing and penalization vary
by party and country. For example, item non-response for Portugal, Spain, and Belgium
was roughly 40% while in France, Germany and Denmark, the average missing rate per
15 An exception to the dichotomous approach is Mondak and Davis (2001), in which DK responses are
randomly assigned as correct.
16 Busch (2016) also uses party placement as the measure for political knowledge but excludes “Don’t
know” responses from the analysis.
80
party was lower than 12%. Similarly, the average distance and its standard deviation per
item vary substantially, likely as a function of the salience and ideology of the party, appli-
cability of the scale to the party system, and number of parties asked.17
To demonstrate the effect of the assumption behind the imputation measure to the
estimated effect of number of parties, I produced variants of the dependent variable with
four different ways of handling the missing responses. Three of the alternatives increase the
countries’ average levels of political knowledge by decreasing the penalty given to miss-
ing responses. The first does not impute any values, which means there is no punishment
but the number of observations is smaller. The second assigns scores for DK response
based on half of the mean distance per party. Thus, the assumption behind this imputation
approach is that those who chose to not pick a value would, on average, be closer to the
average placement of the “correct” score (taken as the sample value) than the majority of
respondents who actually picked a value. The third assigns scores based on the mean dis-
tance score, which implies the response would have been inaccurate in a similar fashion to
the average respondent for that specific party. The fourth approach moves in the different
direction and assumes that the response would have been even farther away than the impu-
tation by GS. Namely, the missing responses would have been inaccurate by the average
distance plus two standard deviations from the party baseline location.18 Table 4.4 presents
17 A full analysis of how the dynamics per party, order of the parties asked, and party system is outside the
scope of this chapter, but it is important to note that even GS recognize that the applicability of the left-right
scale is limited to the Belgium context (see footnote 21). Not surprisingly, the average distance across all
parties in Belgium (1.78) was more than the double of Greece (0.75), where the economy has long been the
central issue of party politics. Moreover, the number of parties in the survey may shape the way respondents
use the space in the scale. In a two-party system like the U.S., respondents have the entire space to place the
parties, while in a context with 8 parties, a socialist party should be placed left of a social-democratic party,
which means the amount of space is much smaller. For that reason, Fortunato, Stevenson and Vonnahme
(2016) and Turgeon and Lloyd (2017) choose to measure political knowledge based on the correct order
rather the exact placement.
18 I also calculated a fifth alternative in which the imputed values are based on the distances of the parties
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the average levels of political knowledge by country according to each of these measures,
and in parentheses, the difference to the original replication by GS.
Table 4.4: Political Knowledge Across Countries- Alternatives to Handle Missing Data
Country
Replication of
Gordon and Segura As Missing Half of Mean Equal to Mean
Mean Plus
2 Standard Deviations
Portugal 7.31 7.78 (0.47) 8.00 (0.69) 7.75 (0.44) 6.87 (-0.44)
Great-Britain 7.08 7.40 (0.32) 7.62 (0.53) 7.40 (0.32) 6.76 (-0.32)
Greece 8.16 8.28 (0.12) 8.35 (0.19) 8.27 (0.12) 8.04 (-0.12)
Spain 6.73 7.20 (0.47) 7.70 (0.97) 7.32 (0.59) 6.14 (-0.59)
France 7.69 7.83 (0.14) 7.89 (0.20) 7.82 (0.13) 7.56 (-0.13)
Ireland 7.16 7.45 (0.29) 7.61 (0.45) 7.44 (0.28) 6.88 (-0.28)
Germany 7.58 7.68 (0.11) 7.71 (0.14) 7.67 (0.09) 7.49 (-0.09)
Netherlands 7.32 7.57 (0.25) 7.66 (0.35) 7.54 (0.22) 7.10 (-0.22)
Luxembourg 7.03 7.38 (0.35) 7.63 (0.60) 7.38 (0.35) 6.68 (-0.35)
Italy 7.29 7.50 (0.21) 7.64 (0.34) 7.51 (0.21) 7.08 (-0.21)
Denmark 7.69 7.84 (0.15) 7.87 (0.18) 7.81 (0.12) 7.58 (-0.12)
Belgium 6.63 7.20 (0.57) 7.61 (0.98) 7.22 (0.59) 6.04 (-0.59)
The three middle columns show an increase of average levels of political knowledge
compared to the original measure, but the magnitude of the difference varies per country.
While the increase is small in France, Germany, and Denmark (the three countries with
lowest average levels of missing per item), the boost in scores is largest in Portugal, Spain
and Belgium (the three with the highest rates of missing). The last column, on the other
hand, shows a drop in levels of knowledge associated with the extra penalty of one standard
deviation for rates of missing. This indicates that the different ways to handle missing data
may impact the estimated relationship between effective number of parties and knowledge
if these changes are correlated with the distribution of number of parties across countries.
We can assess the influence of GS’s imputation strategy by looking at the change in the
respondents provided an answer. That is, if a respondent did not offer a score for party A and C, but it did for
B and D, scores would have been imputed for A and C based on the average of placement distances of B and
D. This approach also increased the levels of knowledge per country, but in a less consistent fashion across
countries than the straightforward mathematical transformations described above.
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estimated relationship between effective number of parties and political knowledge across
countries when using these alternative approaches. Table 4.5 presents the results of the hier-
archical linear regressions with the same set of national-level predictors as GS but varying
the approach to handle “Don’t know” responses.
Table 4.5: Levels of Political Knowledge- Different Alternatives to Handling Missing
Replication
of GS As Missing Half of Mean Equal to Mean
Mean Plus
to 2 Standard
Deviations
ENLP −0.218∗ −0.159∗ −0.109∗ −0.155∗ −0.280
(0.111) (0.067) (0.047) (0.063) (0.165)
Nat. Competitiveness 0.223 0.163 0.126 0.168 0.278
(0.182) (0.110) (0.077) (0.104) (0.272)
Disproportionality −0.053 −0.034 −0.004 −0.024 −0.081
(0.057) (0.034) (0.024) (0.032) (0.085)
Compulsory 0.404 0.366 0.357∗ 0.378 0.430
(0.344) (0.207) (0.146) (0.196) (0.514)
Degree of Unicameralism 0.094 0.103 0.078 0.086 0.102
(0.111) (0.067) (0.047) (0.063) (0.166)
Years Since Election −0.047 −0.011 −0.006 −0.020 −0.075
(0.116) (0.070) (0.049) (0.066) (0.173)
Intercept 7.353∗∗∗ 7.476∗∗∗ 7.530∗∗∗ 7.455∗∗∗ 7.251∗∗∗
(0.918) (0.552) (0.389) (0.523) (1.371)
Num. obs. 11528 6995 11528 11528 11528
Num. of countries 12 12 12 12 12
Var. (countries) 0.157 0.056 0.028 0.051 0.350
Residual 0.527 0.482 0.412 0.353 1.037
Source: Eurobarometer 1989 and national-level factors according to Gordon and Segura (1997)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The first model shows the replicated version of GS’s approach (imputation of mean
plus one standard deviation) without the interaction or multiparty dummy and serves as the
baseline for comparison. The estimated relationship between the number of parties and
political knowledge is negative and slightly above conventional levels of statistical signif-
icance. In the second regression in which “Don’t know” responses were left as missing,
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the magnitude of the effect decreases, but so does the uncertainty around the negative co-
efficient, which indicates the imputation of values in the original analysis increased, on
average, the distance between the countries, but the extent to which the effective number
of parties could predict the knowledge scores was reduced. The same applies to the third
model where the penalty for DK is only half of the mean distance. While the overall effect
is smaller, the size of the standard error around the slope is less than half when using the
original measure. That is, the slope of the line is less inclined, but the points are closer to
the regression line. It should also be noted that in this model the estimated coefficient for
countries with compulsory voting reaches statistical significance.19
Given the imputed values are exactly the average distances per party, the model with
imputation equal to the mean presents results similar to the second regression in which the
missing responses were left out.20 However, the standard errors are smaller due to the
increase in the number of observations in the regression. Thus, the result again shows a
significant negative relationship with less uncertainty around it. Finally, the last column
presents the results when introducing a larger penalty to missing responses in the same
direction as the imputation scheme proposed by GS. This implies the scores for Belgium
as well as Portugal and Spain drop lower, making the distance between the data points
and line farther apart, reducing the proximity to reach statistical significance. I also test
for a potential curvilinear relationship (with ENLP centered at 2), but the squared term
19 GS state that as sensitivity checks, they repeated the analysis with different measures in which the so-
cietal mean distance is imputed for missing values, and a second where individual mean were computed only
across the distances provided, and that the magnitude or significance of results did not change. The reason
for this interpretation was likely the fact they were using OLS regression techniques rather than hierarchical
linear models.
20 The difference stems from the number of imputed values per party placement item. That is, while
the average distance per party would not change after the imputation, the average across parties is slightly
affected.
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is far from statistical significance in all of the regression models.21 This indicates, then,
that the original imputation approach to penalize respondents who choose to not respond
(instead of keeping the responses as missing or assuming they would have fared better
than the average respondent) introduces variation that makes the estimation of a simple
negative relationship between number of parties and levels of knowledge less likely to be
significant. Consequently, the implication of this replication exercise is that the original
finding that more parties in a political system improves knowledge at first but switches to
the negative direction lacks robustness. As mentioned in the previous section, conclusions
drawn from this analysis should be taken with considerable caution.
4.5 Testing with a New Dataset
One method to improve cross-national research that suffers from the “compar-
ative problem”- few cases, many variables- is to increase the number of cases (Lijphart
1971, Przeworski and Teune 1970). A larger number of units reduces the impact of in-
dividual observations and allows for the inclusion of more variables in a model without
compromising statistical power (Jackman 1985). The collection of surveys by the Compar-
ative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project provide an opportunity to reproduce the
analysis discussed above using the same operationalization of political knowledge but with
a larger number of countries.
Similar to the 1989 Eurobarometer data, respondents to CSES surveys were asked
to place a number of their country’s political parties on a left-right spectrum; the only dif-
ference is these surveys used a 11- rather 10-point scale (0-10 in which 0 means “most left”
21 The results of these models are presented in appendix D.
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and 10 “most right”). Following GS’s coding process of using the distance between an in-
dividual respondent and the sample mean placement of a political party, I calculated the
level of political knowledge of participants from 85 surveys in 46 countries that comprise
rounds 3 and 4 of the CSES project.22 These include surveys from a diverse set of demo-
cratic countries in the world with different levels of economic development and political
systems from 2007 to 2016.23
Aside from improving the estimation of the differences in political knowledge across
countries with varying party systems, analyzing this data also allows for a reassessment
of the impact of imputation strategies for “Don’t know” responses. Like in the previous
section, I produced alternatives to GS’s imputation of mean distance plus one standard de-
viation: 1) not imputing any values, 2) imputing values with half of the mean (assuming
less inaccuracy than the average respondent) and 3) imputing values with the mean plus
two standard deviations from the mean (an increased punishment for not providing an an-
swer).24
The drawback of increasing the number and diversity of countries is that to isolate
the relationship between fragmentation of party system and average levels of knowledge,
the inclusion of a number of various statistical controls is required. The CSES dataset
provides a list of standard survey and country-level variables including the Gross Domestic
Product per capita (GDP/pc), recoded in thousands, Freedom House scores, age of the
democratic system, dummies for bicameral and federal countries, compulsory voting, as
22 Three surveys are not included in the analysis due to either the absence of party placement items or
missing effective number of legislative parties.
23 A complete list of surveys by country and year is presented in appendix D.
24 I also calculated alternative with the imputation of the mean per party and distances for items respon-
dents did provide a response, but for the sake of space and because the results are similar to the no imputation
alternative, I decide not to present them here.
86
well as a count of months since the last lower house election.25 At the individual level,
to avoid differences in coding across countries, I use a parsimonious model based on sex,
age (recoded in decades), age-squared and three categories of education level (less than
secondary education, secondary education completed, and post-secondary completed).
Continuous variables age, GDP/pc, and Freedom House scores were centered by
their grand mean in order to give meaning to the intercept and coefficient of interacted
continuous variables.26 Also for a clearer interpretation of the coefficient ENLP, I centered
the variable by a value of 2 effective number of parties, which means the non-squared
coefficient shows the average change in political knowledge associated with going from 2
to 3 ENLP.
For many of the 45 countries, there is more than one survey in the sample, which
makes it is necessary to account for the non-independence between units, similar to the
analysis of AmericasBarometer in chapter 2.27 To do so, I treat the survey as the second-
level unit of analysis and the country as the third, which means the shared characteristics
of surveys from the same country are accounted by the third-level intercepts.28 Finally, I
also calculated the proportion of cases in which the placement of at least one party had to
be imputed, which serves as an indicator of the extent to which the absence of responses
25 Because nine recent surveys did not have an accompanying value for GDP/pc, I coded a value based on
the World Bank online data.
26 Grand mean- GDP/pc: $29166.24; FH score: 5.47; age: 49.19.
27 For instance, the ENLP of the U.S. was 1.94 in 2008 and 1.99 in 2012, whereas the ENLP in Germany
was 4.06 in 2005 and 4.83 in 2009. If they were treated as two independent cases, the results would be biased
due to repetition.
28 The assumption behind this decision is that surveys of a same country are random draws of a population
of potential surveys from that country and are not affected by one another. As a sensitivity check, I conduct
the same analysis with only the last survey per country and present the results in the appendix D. With the
exception that both ENLP coefficients actually reach conventional levels of significance for the imputation
with the standard deviations added, the results and implication are unchanged.
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is driving the results.29 Table 4.6 presents the results of the three-level hierarchical lin-
ear regressions for the different measures of political knowledge according to imputation
strategy, with and without the control for the proportion of missing.30
29 The average proportion across countries was 0.4 (40%) with a standard deviation of 0.2.
30 Due to wide differences across files, I decide to not weight any cases. While this could bias the estimates
of some surveys, it is unclear the extent to which these potential deviations at the survey level are correlated
with any of the estimations here, though I believe there is more work to be done in this topic. Moreover, the
decision to model the data hierarchically should account for differences in sample size across survey. For a
summary of the challenges in using survey weights in regression models, see (Gelman 2007).
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Table 4.6: Political Knowledge across Countries, CSES R3-4
Mean
Plus
1 Dev.
Mean
Plus
1 Dev.
Missing Missing
Half of
Mean
Half of
Mean
Mean
Plus
2 Dev.
Mean
Plus
2 Dev.
Female −0.164∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.007 −0.277∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Age (in 10s) −0.002 −0.002 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age (in 10s)2 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.003∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Secondary educ. 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Post-Secondary 0.473∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
ENLP (centered) 0.113 0.044 0.026 0.001 0.062 0.059 0.175 0.062
(0.068) (0.063) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) (0.058) (0.094) (0.079)
ENLP (centered)2 −0.013 −0.006 −0.003 0.000 −0.011 −0.011 −0.020 −0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
GDP/pc 0.010∗ 0.008 0.008∗ 0.007∗ 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.009
(in thousands) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Freedom House 0.185∗∗ 0.115 0.052 0.021 0.053 0.050 0.292∗∗ 0.177∗
(0.069) (0.064) (0.051) (0.053) (0.056) (0.058) (0.097) (0.080)
Federal −0.400∗ −0.310∗ −0.325∗ −0.293∗ −0.115 −0.111 −0.514∗ −0.345
(0.175) (0.157) (0.129) (0.129) (0.141) (0.143) (0.245) (0.198)
Bicameral 0.024 0.012 −0.018 −0.025 0.085 0.085 0.063 0.043
(0.146) (0.130) (0.107) (0.106) (0.118) (0.119) (0.203) (0.164)
Parliamentary 0.107 0.227 0.126 0.164 0.011 0.016 0.100 0.310
(0.138) (0.126) (0.101) (0.102) (0.113) (0.116) (0.192) (0.159)
Compulsory −0.001 −0.107 −0.088 −0.126 0.003 −0.002 0.065 −0.112
Voting (0.222) (0.199) (0.164) (0.165) (0.178) (0.181) (0.311) (0.250)
Mos. from last −0.005 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.007 −0.001
house election (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Percent −1.134∗∗∗ −0.444 −0.047 −1.972∗∗∗
Missing (0.254) (0.245) (0.236) (0.321)
Intercept 7.861∗∗∗ 8.169∗∗∗ 8.210∗∗∗ 8.339∗∗∗ 8.369∗∗∗ 8.381∗∗∗ 7.494∗∗∗ 8.019∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.243) (0.189) (0.201) (0.213) (0.224) (0.361) (0.307)
Num. obs. 134216 134216 80546 80546 134216 134216 134216 134216
Num. surveys 85 85 83 83 85 85 85 85
Num. countries 46 46 45 45 46 46 46 46
Var. (surveys) 0.109 0.088 0.053 0.050 0.079 0.079 0.198 0.142
Var. (countries) 0.148 0.117 0.085 0.088 0.090 0.091 0.306 0.183
Residual 0.826 0.826 0.818 0.818 0.635 0.635 1.599 1.599
Source: Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES), Rounds 3 and 4
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Similar to previous studies, males and those with higher levels of education are
predicted to have, on average, higher levels of knowledge across countries, which gives us
some confidence in the measure. The first model shows that following GS’s imputation
approach, the relationship between effective number of parties and knowledge seem to
follow a bell-shaped curve. Although the coefficients are not significant, the non-squared
coefficient shows that, on average, an increase from 2 to 3 effective number of legislative
parties is associated with more than a decimal of a point (0.113) in the country’s average
level of knowledge, but the marginal effect decreases gradually by .026 for every other
extra party (i.e. a marginal effect of .087 from 3 to 4 ENLP, and 0.061 from 4 to 5 ENLP).
However, the inclusion of the proportion of cases with at least one “Don’t know” response
substantially reduces the magnitude of the effect of ENLP approximating it to 0. In other
words, because the proportion of missing is correlated with the number of parties and the
average levels of knowledge across countries, the inclusion of the variable in the model
affects the coefficient. The same applies to the imputation that penalizes respondents with
the mean plus two standard deviations (the last two columns). The regression without the
variable measuring proportion of missing indicates at least in magnitude the existence of
a curvilinear relationship, but the introduction of the variable tapping the proportion of
missing is not only highly significant, but also leads the ENLP coefficients to drop far
below conventional levels of statistical significance.
The third and fourth models show the results when not imputing any values. The
coefficients for the effect of number of parties is minute and far from significant. Moreover,
the coefficient for proportion of missing, in contrast to the measures that rely on imputation,
is smaller and not statistically significant, which corroborates the idea that imputation is a
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fundamental component for the results that suggest a bell-shaped relationship. Finally, the
strategy to impute values with half of the mean distance (i.e. assuming respondents who did
not provide an answer would have placed the party half of the distance from the average
respondent who provided an answer) also yields far from significant results for both the
effective number of parties and the proportion of missing variable.
In sum, this analysis using a similar but larger dataset of levels of knowledge across
countries reinforces the results from the previous sections by indicating the relationship
between number of parties and knowledge of the citizenry does not seem to be curvilinear
as scholars have suggested. Alternatively, the results here again show that the imputation
strategy suggested by GS tilts the results in the direction of the curvilinear perspective due
to patterns of “Don’t Know” responses and the penalty introduced by their imputation. Al-
though not presented here, regressions with only the non-squared ENLP term also indicate
that a larger number of effective parties is not associated with either lower or higher levels
of knowledge. Instead, like most recent studies, the results indicate that the relationship
between number of parties and average levels of political knowledge across countries does
not fall in any particular direction, at least in statistical significance terms when using this
measure.31
31 When analyzing the impact of a larger number of parties on individuals with varying levels of education,
the results suggest that those with higher levels of education are significantly better able to handle contexts
with more parties. More specifically, the impact of one additional unit in the effective number of parties is
significantly higher for those who have completed post-secondary education than those who did not, though
the estimated effect for this group does not seem to be distinguishable from 0. Another way to interpret this
result is to say the difference in levels of knowledge between those who completed post-secondary education
and those who did not is larger as the number of effective parties in a political system is also larger. Full
results of the hierarchical liner model and a graph with the estimated coefficient for the groups with varying
levels of education are presented in appendix D.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
How does the number of political parties affect ordinary individuals’ attitudes and
behavior? A prevailing view among a number of scholars is that systems with more polit-
ical parties increase citizens’ political efficacy, or their belief in their ability to understand
and effectively participate in politics, for two reasons. First, a larger number of parties is
theorized to provide a more diverse set of options on the political menu of potential voters,
motivating those who would otherwise feel alienated by a limited choice set to participate
in politics (Dalton 2008, Karp 2012, Powell 1986). Second, a larger number of parties is
theorized to increase competition for votes and outreach efforts from parties, thereby en-
hancing the information available to individuals that will in turn heighten their levels of
political efficacy (Karp 2012, Karp and Banducci 1999).
In reviewing the literature, however, I find the evidence in favor of these arguments
to be limited. Moreover, findings from decades of public opinion research raise important
challenges to the idea that more variety and more information should strengthen citizens
feelings of political efficacy. Behavior scholars point toward evidence that most individ-
uals are not always certain of their own political positions (Converse 1964, Hochschild
1981, Zaller and Feldman 1992) and have difficulties understanding the position of elites
(Miller and Stokes 1963, Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topc¸u 2011), which puts into question
the idea that an increase in the number of parties would improve individuals’ experiences
processing an increasing complex informational environment. In fact, studies indicate that
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ordinary individuals may attribute blame to political actors for non-political events (Achen
and Bartels 2016, Healy, Malhotra and Mo 2010), and tend to become confused by an in-
creased amount of information (Cunow 2014, Lau and Redlawsk 2006, Rahn, Aldrich and
Borgida 1994). Therefore, the arguments that propose a larger number of parties should
lead to higher levels of individual efficacy make strong assumptions about the general pub-
lic’s means to absorb political information and have structured issues opinions that do not
necessarily hold.
This dissertation presents a contrasting view to the diversity of options and mobi-
lization arguments. Building on previous works on political behavior and social cognitive
theory, I argue that institutional arrangements that demand higher cognitive efforts from
citizens, like more political parties in one’s environment, have a negative effect on indi-
viduals’ perceptions about their ability to understand and participate in politics. Moreover,
I propose this effect should be particularly strong among those who have less cognitive
resources to absorb and process political information such as individuals with lower levels
of education.
I test my theory by exploring variation in the number of parties across time in New
Zealand, across municipalities in Brazil, and across countries in the Americas. Results
from chapter two indicate that in environments where there are more parties, levels of
internal efficacy tend to be lower, especially among individuals who did not complete post-
secondary education. In chapter three, I assess the extent to which this negative effect of
more parties also applies to voter turnout. Comparing levels of turnout across municipal-
ities in Colombia and Brazil, I find that when the number of mayoral candidates increase
when compared to the previous municipal election, participation rates lower. Furthermore,
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decreasing levels of turnout after New Zealand’s electoral reform to increase the number
of parties in the country’s point toward a negative relationship between fragmentation of
electoral competition and electoral engagement.
In chapter four, I review works that estimate the relationship between the number
of parties and individuals’ political knowledge, and conduct a detailed re-analysis of pio-
neering works that claim this relationship is positive. My replication indicates this result is
largely driven by the specific measurement of knowledge, the operationalization of multi-
party systems, and especially by the authors’ approach imputation of missing data. I pro-
vide a re-assessment of this relationship with a larger dataset of national surveys throughout
the world and do not find evidence that more parties has a positive impact on individuals’
knowledge of politics.
These results have important implications for potential changes in the arrangement
of party competition across countries. For instance, Gallup polls show that in 2016, 57%
of Americans believed a third party was needed because the Republican and Democratic
parties do a poor job in representing the people (Gallup 2016).1 While the addition of a third
viable party may provide some benefits, the implication of the theory and results presented
here is that the introduction of more parties in American elections could have a detrimental
effect on the public’s perception about their ability to understand and participate in politics,
especially for less educated individuals. Individuals who would most likely benefit from
new parties belong to a politically-informed minority who have clarity that their opinions
do not align with any of the two major parties. For the majority of citizens who do not
1 The polls show that during the past decade, at least 46% Americans believed a third party was needed,
with Independents being the group who most favor the idea.
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have a clear set of preferences and struggle to understand the positions and actions of
parties, the addition of a third party would likely make the process of digesting political
information more difficult. Furthermore, a potential need for coalition-making in order to
form a majority in legislative bodies could harm voter’s ability to attribute responsibility to
incumbent parties.
On the other end of continuum of number of parties, the expanded set of options on
the menu of the general population in Brazil has not led to higher levels of efficacy due to ef-
fective representation and better political information for general population.2 Instead high
degree of party system fragmentation tends to be connected with individuals disengaging
from politics due to difficulties in managing the informational environment (Renno´ 2004,
Cunow 2014), and even to political stability at the elite level (Rousseff 2015).3 It is im-
portant to recognize that the majority of Brazilians parties are not programmatic or highly
institutionalized, but even so, the offer of multiple options when citizens do not have con-
strained belief-systems and cannot process large amounts of political information seems to
increase the burden of making political decisions for the mass public. In fact, the country’s
Congress has recently recognized the issue of hyperfractionalization and passed legislation
to prohibit coalitions for proportional elections and to create of an electoral threshold of
5% of votes in order for a party to gain seats in legislative bodies. Given the conclusions
of previous works and the evidence presented here, it seems reasonable that a reduction
in the number of parties would help ordinary citizens manage the political environment in
2 In recent interviews, political scientists Scott Mainwaring and Marcia Ribeiro Dias have mentioned
that Brazil have uniquely fragmented party system among all democratic experiences (Mainwaring 2015,
Dias 2016).
3 After being impeached, former President Dilma Rousseff stated that the large number of parties has
affected the stability of Brazil’s democratic system by forcing presidents to make large coalition in order to
produce a majority in Congress (Rousseff 2015).
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hyperfractionalized systems.
These results do not imply that countries should necessarily strive to change their
electoral rules to reduce the number of parties to two. A number of works show that pro-
portional elections and larger sizes of districts positively produce a number of important
outcomes such as higher levels of voter turnout (Blais and Carty 1990, Powell 1986), higher
levels of satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997, Anderson et al. 2005),
and more representation among minorities (Norris 1997). Moreover, it is possible that this
negative relationship between number of parties and political engagement is more likely to
be found in political systems where political parties and the party system are less institu-
tionalized. Much of the evidence presented here relied on data from countries from Latin
America where, for the most part, building and maintaining a predictable party system “has
been the exception rather than the norm” (Mainwaring 2018). The linkage between indi-
viduals’ political views and parties seem to be stronger in older and more institutionalized
party systems like those of Western Europe, which means the assumptions behind the ar-
guments that suggest an increase in efficacy associated with more options are more likely
to hold. More and better data on individuals’ political efficacy across countries and time
could shed light on this possibility.
It should be noted that throughout the dissertation there was limited discussion
about the source of variability in number of parties and elections. This decision to focus on
the consequences rather than the sources was made early on in order to dedicate more at-
tention to the main research question and a development of theory, rather than divide efforts
to engage with two related but often separate literatures. On this note, however, it seems
fair to say that there is little variation in the characteristics party systems within countries
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across short periods of time. Previous literature show that the structure of national-level
political competition is largely driven by electoral laws (Duverger 1954, Cox 1997) and
salient social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Torcal and Mainwaring 2003), which
means there should not as much endogeneity at play in the cross-national comparisons. As
noted in Chapters 2 and 3, on the other hand, the comparison across time in New Zealand
can be problematic given the origins of the electoral reform was directly related to individ-
uals’ perceptions of elections and parties. The source of variation in the number of mayoral
candidates across municipalities in Colombia and Brazil and its implications for causal in-
ference are hard to pin point. The use of statistical of multiple controls was an attempt to
account for potential biases. Moreover, the similarity between the results presented here
and more controlled analysis of the same phenomenon (Cunow 2014, Lau and Redlawsk
2006) suggests the origins of the variation have not misled the analysis in any way.
It also was not an objective of this project to calculate an optimal number of parties
in a system or election to improve individuals’ feelings of efficacy. Yet, research by Carey
and Hix (2011) suggests that proportional elections with mid-sized districts that lead to be-
tween four and six parties may serve as an optimal arrangement that can promote effective
representation while producing simple government coalitions.
One difficulty in searching for an optimal number based on the empirics presented
in this dissertation is that some of the analyses utilize the effective number of parties or
candidates, which can imply ambiguous total number of parties or electoral options. More-
over, the analyses in chapters two and three that include both the total and effective number
of candidates indicate that, similar to results by Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005), the two
measures may yield different estimates regarding the relationship between fragmentation
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of party system and political behavior. Although this result seems to be driven by how con-
texts with a large number of parties are measured, the difference in how the effective and
total number of parties affect political behavior should further explored by future works.
Another important point that deserves attention from scholars is the relationship be-
tween internal from external efficacy. Early works in political behavior paid a good deal of
attention to the measurement and distribution of political efficacy, but over the last couple
of decades, investigations about the mechanisms through which individuals develop these
beliefs have been sparse. Moreover, while studies reveal that the two components of ef-
ficacy tend to be at least moderately correlated, it is important to know what and when
context-level variables have distinct impacts on feelings about self-capacity and institu-
tional responsiveness. For instance, chapter two shows that the immediate impact of the
electoral reform in New Zealand was substantively positive for external efficacy, but posi-
tive then negative for internal efficacy.
Scholars may also explore the potential differences between comparisons between
higher levels and change in number of parties. While this dissertation sought to perform
cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis, the argument presented here does not differenti-
ate between the two. Both higher levels of, and positive change (increase) in the number of
political competitors is theorized to increase the complexity of the informational environ-
ment, and consequently lower individuals’ feeling of internal efficacy. The marginal effect
of extra electoral options or legislative parties may differ depending on the initial level of
fragmentation or specificities of the political context such as new and salient issues that
realign competition between parties.
Furthermore, the type and level of competition between parties and candidates may
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be one avenue for scholars to continue exploring varying effects of context-level factors on
efficacy and behavior. As a diverse set of works point toward the importance of competition
to political engagement and social outcomes (Hiskey 2003, Kam and Utych 2011, Levine
and Palfrey 2007, Vowles 2010), future research may explore the moderating effects of the
number, type of electoral options and level of competitiveness on political engagement, and
effective government.
These are among topics that I will continue to pursue. But for now, this dissertation
addresses the question of how the number of parties shape political behavior. It presents
a negative view of expanding the number of parties on political efficacy and engagement,
especially for those with lower levels of education. Considering internal efficacy beliefs
are predictors of support for democracy and political participation, observers and scholars
of democracy may be well advised to take into consideration the disadvantage multiple
parties can have on individuals’ internal efficacy beliefs, particularly for non-consolidated
democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Information to Chapter One
Figure A.1: Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties in Developing Countries by Region
of the World
Africa
Asia
(British) Africa
(British) Asia
Eastern Europe
Latin America
Middle East and
 Northern Africa
Fragmentation of Party Systems in Developing Countries
Effective Number of Parties, Seats
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14
Source: Gallagher, Michael. 2017. Election indices dataset, accessed 2017 01 23.
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Figure B.1: Distributions of Responses to Efficacy Questions, New Zealand 1993-1996
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Figure B.2: Change in Efficacy Across Time, New Zealand 1993-1996
Internal Efficacy
Change in Internal Efficacy, 1993-1996
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
External Efficacy
Change in External Efficacy, 1993-1996
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4 -2 0 2 4
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
101
Table B.1: Change in Political Efficacy, New Zealand 1993-1996
Model 1 Model 2
Internal External
Male 0.071 0.012
(0.055) (0.071)
Age 0.001 −0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
No formal education 0.025 −0.050
(0.075) (0.096)
Secondary education 0.057 −0.127
(0.070) (0.092)
Post-secondary education −0.043 −0.036
(0.091) (0.122)
Britain Nationality 0.031 −0.031
(0.091) (0.116)
Other Nationality −0.079 −0.114
(0.118) (0.155)
Region of country dummies Yes Yes
Maori ancestry, Yes 0.156 −0.111
(0.098) (0.126)
Maori ancestry, DK −0.421∗ 0.264
(0.165) (0.208)
Religious identification dummies Yes Yes
Intercept 0.055 0.134
(0.094) (0.125)
Adj. R2 0.001 -0.000
Num. obs. 915 991
New Zealand Elections Studies, 1993-1996
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table B.2: Change in Political Efficacy, New Zealand 1996-1999
Model 1 Model 2
Internal External
Male −0.003 −0.015
(0.087) (0.096)
Age 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
No formal education −0.233 −0.205
(0.181) (0.193)
Secondary education 0.155 0.068
(0.098) (0.109)
Post-secondary education 0.289∗ −0.084
(0.137) (0.151)
Region of country dummies Yes Yes
Maori ancestry, Yes 0.006 0.110
(0.102) (0.112)
Maori ancestry, DK 0.205 −0.047
(0.348) (0.367)
Religious identification dummies Yes Yes
Intercept −0.204 0.166
(0.135) (0.149)
Adj. R2 0.025 0.015
Num. obs. 428 446
New Zealand Elections Studies, 1996-1999
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table B.3: Change in Political Efficacy, New Zealand 1999-2002
Model 1 Model 2
Internal External
Male −0.003 −0.015
(0.087) (0.096)
Age 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
No formal education −0.233 −0.205
(0.181) (0.193)
Secondary Education 0.155 0.068
(0.098) (0.109)
Post-secondary Education 0.289∗ −0.084
(0.137) (0.151)
Region of country dummies Yes Yes
Maori ancestry, Yes 0.006 0.110
(0.102) (0.112)
Maori ancestry, DK 0.205 −0.047
(0.348) (0.367)
Religious identification dummies Yes Yes
Intercept −0.204 0.166
(0.135) (0.149)
Adj. R2 0.025 0.015
Num. obs. 428 446
New Zealand Elections Studies, 1999-2002
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure B.3: Number of Candidates in All and Sampled Municipalities, Brazil 2012
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Figure B.4: Total and Effective Number of Candidates in Sampled Municipalities, Brazil
2014
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Figure B.5: Effect of Increasing Unit in Effective Number of Parties on Efficacy, Brazil
2014
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Table B.4: Correlation between Party System Characteristics
n=137 obs ENLP
Electoral Volatility .039
n=78 obs ENLP
Polarization (PELA) .064
n=48 obs Electoral Volatility
Polarization (PELA) .251
Electoral volatility values from 2008 and 2010 come from Alca´ntara (2012), and 2012 and 2014
values come from my own collection of data and calculations.
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Table B.5: Hierarchical Linear Models of Internal Efficacy across Municipalities with less
than 200,000 voters, Brazil 2014
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Internal efficacy (national) 0.649∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Female −0.206∗ −0.207∗ −0.207∗ −0.206∗
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Age 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
No formal education −0.781∗∗ −0.765∗∗ −0.765∗∗ −0.781∗∗
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246) (0.246)
Secondary education 0.226 0.222 0.230∗ 0.227
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
Post-Secondary education 0.466∗ 0.474∗ 0.486∗ 0.466∗
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193)
Urban −0.236 −0.285 −0.268 −0.236
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157)
Wealth Quintiles Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of candidates −0.114 −0.114
(0.069) (0.075)
ENC (centered) −0.060 0.076 0.000
(0.100) (0.148) (0.106)
ENC (centered)2 −0.099
(0.079)
Incumbent 0.222 0.187 0.166 0.222
(0.129) (0.130) (0.131) (0.131)
Institutionalized parties 0.165 0.139 0.135 0.165
(0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094)
Average size of coalition −0.094∗ −0.064 −0.051 −0.094∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.038)
Non-ideological coalitions −0.093 −0.061 −0.079 −0.093
(0.140) (0.141) (0.142) (0.141)
Size of Municipality (5 cat.) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region categories (5 cat.) Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Intercept) 1.843∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 1.363∗∗∗ 1.841∗∗∗
(0.460) (0.400) (0.409) (0.464)
Num. obs. 915 915 915 915
Num. municipalities 77 77 77 77
Var. (municipalities) 0.079 0.088 0.087 0.083
Var: Residual 1.688 1.688 1.687 1.688
Source: AmericasBarometer Brazil 2014 and Brazil’s Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 108
Table B.6: Heterogenous Effect of Number of Candidates on Education Levels, Brazil 2014
Model 1
Internal efficacy (national) Yes
Female Yes
Age Yes
No formal education −0.203
(1.697)
Secondary education 0.621
(0.578)
Post-Secondary education −0.580
(1.077)
Urban Yes
Wealth Quintiles Yes
Number of candidates −0.106
(0.066)
Institutionalized parties 0.196
(0.113)
Non-ideological coalitions 0.077
(0.175)
Incumbent 0.125
(0.155)
Average size of coalition −0.082
(0.050)
Size of Municipality (5 cat.) Yes
Region categories (5 cat.) Yes
ENC (centered) Yes
Number of candidates * No formal education 0.214
(0.196)
Number of candidates * Secondary education 0.010
(0.068)
Number of candidates * Post-Secondary education 0.074
(0.120)
Institutionalized parties * No formal education −0.450
(0.547)
Institutionalized parties * Secondary education −0.190
(0.127)
Institutionalized parties * Post-Secondary education −0.066
(0.191)
Non-ideological coalitions * Educ. cats Yes
Incumbent * Educ. cats Yes
Average size of coalition * Educ. cats Yes
Size of Municipality (5 cat.) * Educ. cats Yes
Region categories (5 cat.) * Educ. cats Yes
Intercept 1.809∗∗∗
(0.547)
Num. obs. 1429
Num. municipalities 104
Var. (municipalities) 0.072
Var. Residual 1.504
Source: AmericasBarometer Brazil 2014 and Brazil’s Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 109
Table B.7: Internal Efficacy across Municipalities by Number of Candidates, Brazil 2014
Model 1
Internal efficacy (national) 0.650∗∗∗
(0.026)
Female −0.206∗
(0.087)
Age 0.005
(0.003)
No formal education −0.800∗∗
(0.246)
Secondary education 0.225
(0.116)
Post-Secondary education 0.448∗
(0.192)
Urban −0.290
(0.157)
Wealth Quintiles Yes
1 Candidate −0.640
(0.390)
3 Candidates −0.460∗∗
(0.161)
4 Candidates −0.457∗
(0.204)
5-8 Candidates −0.460
(0.287)
9+ Candidates −0.664
(0.598)
Institutionalized parties 0.158
(0.092)
Incumbent 0.250∗
(0.128)
Average size of coalition −0.094∗
(0.039)
Non-ideological coalitions −0.181
(0.138)
Turnout 2012 1.905
(1.463)
Size of Municipality (5 cat.) Yes
Region categories (5 cat.) Yes
Intercept 0.511
(1.310)
Num. obs. 915
Num. municipalities 77
Var. (municipalities) 0.062
Var. Residual 1.689
Source: AmericasBarometer Brazil 2014 and Brazil’s Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table B.8: Heterogenous Effects of ENLP by Level of Education, AmericasBarometer
2008-2014
Model 1
Male Yes
Age Yes
Age2 Yes
No formal education 0.247
(0.459)
Secondary education −0.546∗∗
(0.180)
Post-Secondary education −1.421∗∗∗
(0.250)
Educ. (DK/NA) −2.865∗∗∗
(0.766)
Urban Yes
Urban (NA) Yes
ENLP (centered) −0.053∗
(0.022)
Federal Yes
Bicameral Yes
Seats (log) Yes
Freedom House Yes
Age of Democracy Yes
Human Development Index Yes
No. months near election (log) Yes
Year dummies Yes
ENLP (centered) * No formal education 0.019
(0.016)
ENLP (centered) * Secondary education 0.013∗
(0.006)
ENLP (centered) * Post-Secondary education 0.044∗∗∗
(0.008)
ENLP (centered) * Educ. (DK/NA) −0.046
(0.029)
Federal * Educ. cats Yes
Bicameral * Educ. cats Yes
Seats (log) * Educ. cats Yes
Freedom House * Educ. cats Yes
Age of Democracy * Educ. cats Yes
HDI * Educ. cats Yes
No. months near election (log) * Educ. cats Yes
Intercept 3.871∗∗∗
(0.675)
Num. obs. 147853
Num. surveys 91
Num. countries 24
Var: surveys 0.036
Var: countries 0.037
Var: Residual 3.106
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008-2014 and other country-level indicators.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Supplementary Information to Chapter Three
Figure C.1: Turnout Rates in Mayoral Elections in Colombia, 2003-2011
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Table C.1: Levels of Turnout across Municipalities with Categorical Variable
∆ Turnout, 2007 ∆ Turnout, 2011
Turnoutt−1 −0.470∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018)
1 Candidate −3.430∗ −6.528∗∗
(1.587) (2.100)
3 Candidates 0.151 −0.849∗
(0.537) (0.365)
4 Candidates −0.291 −1.020∗∗
(0.573) (0.390)
5-8 Candidates −1.648∗∗ −1.663∗∗∗
(0.553) (0.391)
9+ Candidates −2.181∗ 0.416
(1.078) (1.089)
Number of Candidatest−1 −0.051 −0.021
(0.122) (0.076)
Margin of Victoryt−1 0.017 0.007
(0.011) (0.009)
Winner coalitiont 0.876
(0.857)
Number of coalitionst −0.702
(0.533)
Size of Electorate- Very Small 2.044∗∗ 1.748∗∗
(0.787) (0.546)
Size of Electorate- Small 0.099 0.250
(0.744) (0.508)
Size of Electorate- Large −1.144 −1.823
(1.586) (1.101)
Size of Electorate- Very Large −2.715 −3.363∗∗
(1.552) (1.050)
Dummies for department Yes Yes
Intercept 33.016∗∗∗ 26.956∗∗∗
(5.336) (3.843)
Adj. R2 0.518 0.835
Num. obs. 890 906
Source: Electoral National Institute of Colombia
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
The models indicate that elections with one candidate have lower levels of turnout
by about 3.4 and 6.5 points compared to two-candidate elections, which corroborates the
idea that a minimal number of alternatives important for fostering individual engagement.1
On the other hand, elections with a larger number of candidates are associated with lower
levels of turnout. While there were no statistically significant differences with elections
between two and four candidates in 2007, turnout rates in municipalities with elections
with five through eight and nine or more mayoral candidates were lower by roughly 1.6,
even controlling for the level of electoral turnout and number of candidates in the last race.
1 A possible explanation for the fact turnout rates are not even lower in uncontested mayoral elections is
that voters still get to vote for governor and local councilmen.
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Figure C.2: Turnout Rates in Mayoral Elections in Brazil, 2008-2012
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Figure C.3: Map of Municipalities by Number of Candidates, Brazil 2012
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Table C.2: Levels of Turnout across Municipalities including Campaign Expenditures,
Brazil 2012
Turnoutt ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout
Turnoutt−1 −0.198∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Number of Candidatest −0.868∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗
(0.147) (0.078)
∆ Number of Candidates −0.196∗
(0.078)
Number of Candidatest−1 −0.254∗∗
(0.080)
Incumbentt 0.127 0.060 0.071
(0.131) (0.069) (0.069)
Institutionalized Partiest −0.160 −0.086 −0.085
(0.103) (0.054) (0.054)
Average Size of Coalitionst −0.460∗∗∗ −0.062∗ −0.058∗
(0.050) (0.027) (0.027)
Size of Coalition of Winning Candidatet −0.012 −0.001 −0.000
(0.026) (0.014) (0.014)
Non-ideological Coalitionst 0.293∗ 0.093 0.093
(0.145) (0.076) (0.076)
Number of Male Candidatest −0.110 0.068 0.067
(0.112) (0.059) (0.059)
Number of Married Candidatest 0.163 0.097∗ 0.092∗
(0.085) (0.045) (0.045)
Number of Candidates with Post-Secondary Educationt −0.233∗∗ −0.060 −0.059
(0.074) (0.039) (0.039)
Log of Maximal Expenditures by Candidates −0.497∗∗∗ −0.069 −0.064
(0.068) (0.036) (0.036)
Size of Electorate- Small −1.048∗∗∗ 0.156 0.168
(0.240) (0.127) (0.128)
Size of Electorate- Medium −0.298 0.292 0.312
(0.326) (0.172) (0.172)
Size of Electorate- Large 1.229∗ 0.654∗ 0.722∗
(0.532) (0.281) (0.283)
Size of Electorate- Very Large 3.307∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 1.360∗∗∗
(0.667) (0.353) (0.357)
Dummies for states Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 94.501∗∗∗ 16.840∗∗∗ 16.941∗∗∗
(1.235) (0.952) (0.953)
Adj. R2 0.375 0.465 0.465
Num. obs. 4883 4883 4883
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table C.3: Levels of Turnout across Municipalities with Categorical Number of Candi-
dates, Brazil 2012
Turnoutt ∆ Turnout
Turnoutt−1 −0.200∗∗∗
(0.007)
1 Candidate −0.557 −0.959∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.167)
3 Candidates −1.496∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.096)
4 Candidates −2.396∗∗∗ −0.503∗∗
(0.315) (0.166)
5-8 Candidates −2.874∗∗∗ −0.769∗∗
(0.501) (0.264)
9+ Candidates −1.313 −0.377
(1.641) (0.862)
Number of Candidatest−1 −0.309∗∗∗ −0.066∗
(0.054) (0.028)
Incumbentt 0.155 0.015
(0.123) (0.065)
Institutionalized Partiest −0.102 −0.075
(0.098) (0.051)
Average Size of Coalitionst −0.545∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗
(0.046) (0.024)
Size of Coalition of Winning Candidatet 0.015 0.005
(0.026) (0.013)
Non-ideological Coalitionst 0.283∗ 0.058
(0.135) (0.071)
Number of Male Candidatest −0.156 0.063
(0.104) (0.055)
Number of Married Candidatest 0.190∗ 0.111∗∗
(0.081) (0.042)
Number of Candidates with Post-Secondary Educationt −0.265∗∗∗ −0.071
(0.070) (0.037)
Size of Electorate- Small −1.331∗∗∗ 0.149
(0.228) (0.120)
Size of Electorate- Medium −0.729∗ 0.259
(0.309) (0.162)
Size of Electorate- Large 0.388 0.526
(0.519) (0.272)
Size of Electorate- Very Large 1.290 0.877∗
(0.669) (0.351)
Dummies for states Yes Yes
Intercept 88.312∗∗∗ 16.203∗∗∗
(0.978) (0.789)
Adj. R2 0.385 0.469
Num. obs. 5562 5562
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 117
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Figure D.1: Respondents’ Placement of the British Conservative Party and Associated
Measures of Political Knowledge
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The graph on the left shows the distribution of responses placing the British Conserva-
tive Party on the left-right spectrum. The top three numbers picked were 10, 9 and 8, and
the mean was just above 8 (8.16). The graph in the middle displays the distance from the
mean response. Those who picked 8 were only 0.16 away and those who picked 9 were
less than one point (0.84) away from the “correct” answer. Those who picked less than 7
were more than 2 points away.
The graph on the right shows the same distribution of distance from the mean, but
with the addition of the values imputed according to the strategy proposed by Gordon and
Segura (1997). Those who did not place the Conservative Party on a left-right spectrum
(approximately 12% of the sample) received a distance score equal to the mean distance
plus one standard deviation of the mean, in this case, about 3 points (2.86), which is worse
than 78% of the sample.
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Table D.1: Models of Cross-National Levels of Political Knowledge Allowing for
Curvilinearity- Different Alternatives to Handling Missing
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ENLP (centered) −0.022 −0.147 −0.197 −0.139 0.096
(0.299) (0.191) (0.126) (0.181) (0.427)
ENLP (centered)2 −0.039 −0.002 0.017 −0.003 −0.075
(0.055) (0.035) (0.023) (0.033) (0.078)
Nat. Competitiveness 0.195 0.161 0.139 0.166 0.223
(0.196) (0.125) (0.083) (0.119) (0.280)
Disproportionality −0.042 −0.033 −0.009 −0.023 −0.061
(0.061) (0.039) (0.026) (0.037) (0.088)
Compulsory 0.483 0.371 0.323∗ 0.385 0.581
(0.379) (0.242) (0.160) (0.229) (0.542)
Degree of Unicameralism 0.124 0.104 0.065 0.088 0.159
(0.124) (0.079) (0.052) (0.075) (0.178)
Years Since Election −0.015 −0.009 −0.021 −0.017 −0.012
(0.130) (0.083) (0.055) (0.079) (0.187)
Intercept 6.685∗∗∗ 7.143∗∗∗ 7.414∗∗∗ 7.126∗∗∗ 6.244∗∗∗
(0.958) (0.612) (0.404) (0.580) (1.371)
Num. obs. 11528 6995 11528 11528 11528
Num. of countries 12 12 12 12 12
Var. (countries) 0.174 0.070 0.031 0.063 0.356
Residual 0.527 0.482 0.412 0.353 1.037
Source: Eurobarometer 1989 and national-level factors according to Gordon and Segura (1997)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table D.2: Political Knowledge across Countries, CSES Rounds 3 and 4
Mean
Plus
1 Dev.
Mean
Plus
1 Dev.
Missing Missing
Half of
Mean
Half of
Mean
Mean
Plus
2 Dev.
Mean
Plus
2 Dev.
Female −0.160∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Age (in 10s) 0.004 0.004 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.005∗ −0.005∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Age (in 10s)2 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Secondary 0.234∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Post-Secondary 0.466∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
ENLP (centered) 0.203∗ 0.066 0.070 0.064 0.045 0.022 0.316∗ 0.056
(0.097) (0.106) (0.075) (0.085) (0.080) (0.095) (0.134) (0.134)
ENLP (centered)2 −0.023∗ −0.008 −0.007 −0.006 −0.007 −0.004 −0.036∗ −0.008
(0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
GDP/pc 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.004
(in thousands) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Freedom House 0.307∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.139∗ 0.134 0.109 0.096 0.455∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗
(0.088) (0.087) (0.066) (0.072) (0.073) (0.078) (0.123) (0.110)
Federal −0.168 −0.186 −0.239 −0.238 −0.249 −0.252 −0.122 −0.158
(0.260) (0.242) (0.195) (0.198) (0.215) (0.218) (0.360) (0.306)
Bicameral 0.132 0.122 0.028 0.027 0.030 0.029 0.239 0.220
(0.200) (0.186) (0.149) (0.151) (0.166) (0.168) (0.278) (0.236)
Parliamentary −0.201 −0.037 −0.053 −0.045 −0.107 −0.079 −0.323 −0.012
(0.210) (0.206) (0.156) (0.166) (0.174) (0.185) (0.291) (0.261)
Compulsory −0.004 −0.188 −0.113 −0.122 −0.140 −0.172 0.097 −0.255
Voting (0.262) (0.255) (0.196) (0.206) (0.217) (0.229) (0.363) (0.322)
Mos. from last −0.010 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005 −0.003 −0.002 −0.015 −0.002
house election (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Percent −1.188∗ −0.072 −0.205 −2.257∗∗∗
Missing (0.475) (0.422) (0.427) (0.601)
Intercept 8.060∗∗∗ 8.335∗∗∗ 8.336∗∗∗ 8.355∗∗∗ 8.412∗∗∗ 8.460∗∗∗ 7.781∗∗∗ 8.303∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.384) (0.294) (0.319) (0.327) (0.346) (0.548) (0.486)
Num. obs. 66866 66866 39199 39199 66866 66866 66866 66866
Num. surveys 44 44 43 43 44 44 44 44
Var. (surveys) 0.276 0.239 0.150 0.155 0.189 0.194 0.531 0.383
Residual 0.839 0.839 0.830 0.830 0.589 0.589 1.653 1.653
Source: Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES), Rounds 3 and 4
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table D.3: HLM Models with Cross-Level Interactions Between Levels of Education and
National-Level Factors on Political Knowledge across Countries, CSES R3-4
Level of Political Knowledge (DK=Missing)
Female Yes
Age (in 10s) Yes
Secondary education 0.167∗∗∗
(0.023)
Post-Secondary education 0.286∗∗∗
(0.033)
ENLP (centered) 0.002
(0.026)
Federal −0.306∗
(0.130)
Bicameral Yes
Parliamentary Yes
GDP/pc 0.007∗
(in thousands) (0.003)
Freedom House 0.031
(0.052)
Compulsory Yes
Mos. from last house election Yes
ENLP * Secondary education −0.003
(0.005)
ENLP * Post-Secondary education 0.015∗
(0.006)
Federal * Secondary education −0.050∗
(0.021)
Federal * Post-Secondary education 0.002
(0.028)
Bicameral * Secondary education Yes
Bicameral * Post-Secondary education Yes
Parliamentary * Secondary education Yes
Parliamentary * Post-Secondary education Yes
GDP/pc * Secondary education 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
GDP/pc * Post-Secondary education 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Freedom House * Secondary education 0.022
(0.012)
Freedom House * Post-Secondary education 0.043∗∗
(0.016)
Compulsory * Secondary education Yes
Compulsory * Post-Secondary education Yes
Intercept 8.211∗∗∗
(0.187)
Num. obs. 80546
Num. surveys 83
Num. countries 45
Var. (surveys) 0.051
Var. (countries) 0.091
Var: Residual 0.818
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Figure D.2: Estimated Impact of a Larger Number of ENLP by Individuals’ Levels of
Education
β ENLP
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